Whistleblower Protections Under The Sarbanes-0xley Act: A Primer and a Critique
Introduction
In the wake of scandals involving Enron Corporation, Arthur Andersen and other
corporations, Congress enacted the landmark Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Corporate
and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002 (hereinafter the “Act” or “SarbanesOxley”).1 Sarbanes-Oxley provides for sweeping reforms in the way that publicly held
corporations account for and make public disclosures under federal securities laws.2

1

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 , 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15
U.S.C.A. s. 7201 et seq.; 29 U.S.C.A. 1021; 29 U.S.C.A. 1132; 15 U.S.C.A. 7245 et seq.;
15 U.S.C.A. s. 78a et seq.; 18 U.S.C.A. s. 1501 et seq. (2002) [hereinafter the “Act” or
Sarbanes-Oxley].
2

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 745. Generally,
Sarbanes-Oxley creates a new federal agency, the Public Accounting Oversight Board,
alters the way accounting and consulting firms are permitted to practice, alters corporate
governance practices (in requiring all public companies to have independent audit
committees); and imposes broader and more severe criminal penalties in the accounting
and securities fraud areas. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat.
745 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. s. 7201 et seq.; 29 U.S.C.A. 1021; 29 U.S.C.A. 1132; 15
U.S.C.A. 7245 et seq.; 15 U.S.C.A. s. 78a et seq.; 18 U.S.C.A. s. 1501 et seq. (2002)).
Numerous articles and commentaries have already been written about Sarbanes-Oxley,
but the author believes this to be the first law review article compiling an extensive
history of whistleblower decisions under SOX. See e.g., Developments in the Law –
Corporations and Society, Lawyer Conduct and Corporate Misconduct, Harvard L. Rev.
(May 2004), Jennifer Wheeler, Securities Law: Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act:
Irreconcilable Conflict with the ABA’s Model Rules and the Oklahoma Rules of
Professional Conduct? 56 Oklahoma L.Rev. 461 (Summer 2003); Gary G. Grindler,
Jason A. Jones, Please Step Away from the Shredder and the ‘Delete’ Key: ss. 802 and
1102 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 41 Am. Crim. L.Rev. 67 (Winter 2004); Miriam A.
Cherry, Whistling the Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers and the Implications of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 Wash. L.Rev. 1029 (Nov. 2004); Robert
C. Brighton, Jr., Sarbanes-Oxley: A Primer for Public Companies , and Their Officers
and Directors, and Audit Firms, 28 Nova L.Rev. 605 (Spring 2004); Samantha Ahuja,
What Do I Do Now? A Lawyer’s Duty Post-Sarbanes-Oxley” 38 Valparaiso U.L.Rev.
1263 (Summer 2004); Lauren C. Cohen, In-House Counsel and the Attorney-Client
Privilege: How Sarbanes-Oxley Misses the Point, 9 Stan.J.L.Bus.and Finance 297
(Spring 2004); see Leonard M. Baynes, Just Pucker and Blow?: An Analysis of
Corporate Whistleblowers, the Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty and the Sarbanes-Oxley
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President George W. Bush signed the bill into law and touted the Act as a “far-reaching”
reform of American business practices.3 In attempting to reform American business
practices, Congress impressed into service corporate officers, directors, and other
corporate employees, enlisting them as “foot soldiers” in the fight against corporate
fraud. Congress did so by requiring those who witness corporate fraud to report what
they know about it4 and by offering commiserate protection from retaliation under the
“whistleblower protection” provisions contained within Sarbanes-Oxley.5 Yet, despite
Sarbanes-Oxley being touted as a new bulwark against corporate fraud, the courts
continue to weaken these whistleblower provisions6 and newspapers continue to report
scandals involving corporate fraud.7 It seems that those who might blow the whistle and
protect corporate shareholders are not coming forward soon enough to prevent corporate

Act, 76 St. John’s L.Rev. 875 (Fall 2002) (published in the aftermath of the Enron
scandal and in the same year as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
3

President George W. Bush, Remarks at Signing of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (July
30, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020730.html
4

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 , 116 Stat. 745 (codified at
various sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C). See supra note 1.
5

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 , 116 Stat. 745 (codified at
various sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C). See supra note 1. Congress also requires
companies to set up procedures for receiving and retaining reports of such fraud. See
Sarbanes-Oxley Act s. 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. s. 78j-1 (West Supp. 2003).
6

National Law Journal Online, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, “Protect the Whistleblower,” by
Lynne Bernabel and Jason Zuckerman, www.nlj.com (site visited June 23, 2006); see
infra notes 144 to 145, 146 and accompanying discussion.
7

See, e.g., Reni Gertner, Litigation Over Option Backdating Increases, St. Louis Daily
Record, Sept. 2, 2006.
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fraud8 and whistleblower protections have not accomplished their intended purpose. The
question then is: are the administrative procedures and legal standards inherent in
Sarbanes-Oxley such that the whistleblower protections are more illusory than
functional?
This article sets out to answer this question, critically examining the
whistleblower protections afforded employees under Sarbanes-Oxley. Part I of the article
considers the statutory language, the legislative history, and the regulations pursuant to
the Act. Part II of the article examines recent decisions by the U.S. Department of Labor
in Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower cases (cases under the Act are initially adjudicated by
the Department of Labor)9 and the overall framework for implementation of the law. The
manner in which Sarbanes-Oxley relates to state law, particularly the doctrine of at-will
employment, is discussed in Part III. In Part IV, the breadth and effectiveness of the
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protections and the existing legal and corporate cultural
framework is considered. Finally, Part V proposes suggestions for improving current
whistleblower protections under Sarbanes-Oxley so that they will accomplish their
intended legislative purposes.
This article concludes that rulings on Sarbnes-Oxley complaints and the
implementation of existing regulations adopted by the Department of Labor to date

8

Sarbanes-Oxley specifies that whistleblower complaints are supposed to be confidential
and anonymous and that companies are supposed to set up procedures for the treatment of
these complaints. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act s. 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. s. 78j-1 (West
Supp. 2003). Because such procedures are not specified in the Act, treatment can mean
something insignificant such as filing and reviewing. See Cherry, supra note 1, at 107172.
9

18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b).
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evidence that Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protections are not nearly strong enough to
protect whistleblowing employees and to bring about the changes envisioned by
Congress.10 Rather, the existing legal framework does not compel corporations to root
out fraud,11 and imposes undue waiting periods on whistleblowers. Moreover, in May
2006, the already anemic framework suffered another blow in the Second Circuit.12 In
Bechtel v. Competitive Technologies, the Circuit Court questioned the viability of allimportant Sarbanes-Oxley provisions that call for immediate reinstatement of a
whistleblowing employee who establishes “reasonable cause”13 before a hearing that his
termination was in retaliation for his whistleblowing.14 This decision, holding the
reinstatement remedy under Sarbanes-Oxley unenforceable in a federal court, strikes a
deadly blow to whistleblowing employees and the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower
provisions generally.15 What Bechtel makes abundantly clear is that as it is being

10

See infra notes 54-58, 180-202 and accompanying discussion.

11

Indeed, at least one article, partially written to reassure corporation counsels, noted that
“the avalanche” of whistleblower claims that some predicted has not come to fruition.
See Grotta Glassman, Sarbanes Oxley Whistleblower Protection – Two Years Later –
What Hath Enron Wrought? Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, Feb. 2005 Northeast Ed.,
p. 23.
12

Bechtel v. Competitive Tech. Inc., 448 F.3d 469 (2d Cir. 2006). Federal Whistleblower
Law, 4th Circuit.
13

Bechtel v. Competitive Tech. Inc., 448 F.3d at 472-73; see 18 U.S.C. s. 1514A (b)(2)
(adopting 49 U.S.C. s. 42121(b)).
14

See 18 U.S.C. s. 1514A (b)(2) (adopting 49 U.S.C. s. 42121(b)). Bechtel v.
Competitive Tech. Inc., 448 F.3d at 472-74.
15

Bechtel v. Competitive Tech. Inc., 448 F.3d at 72-74; see infra notes 144-45, 147 and
accompanying discussion. This decision holding the reinstatement remedy potentially
unenforceable seems to be in line with current judicial thinking. On May 30, 2006, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that a public employee claiming retaliation for speaking against
an employer decision had not engaged in protected speech sufficient to claim retaliation
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implemented, the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower provisions will not protect and
encourage corporate whistleblowers.16
Normatively, it appears that meaningful changes must occur on three levels to
protect and encourage whistleblowers to “whistle” early on and to thereby prevent
corporate fraud: i) there must be more exacting implementation of the existing SarbanesOxley regulations; ii) administrative tribunals and courts must give effect to the intent of
the statute: to actually protect whistleblowers; and iii) years after the “Enron wake-up
call,” public companies must still reform their business cultures to encourage the free
flow of information and reporting of wrongdoing.
Whistleblower protection is a critical part of Sarbanes-Oxley and fraud
prevention.17 Loyal employees with information to report about their corporate employer
will only come forward readily – to protect investors and individual shareholders against
corporate fraud – when they believe that their livelihoods will be protected in an
immediate and real way. Only when all employees are watching – and no one is afraid to
blow the whistle – will the incidence of fraud in public corporations drop to an acceptable
level.

for the communications he had made. Garcetti et al. v. Ceballos, No. 04-473 (U.S. May
30, 2006); see also Bechtel v. Competitive Tech. Inc., 448 F.3d at 72-74. While Garcetti
was not a Sarbanes–Oxley whistleblower case, it does not bode well for future
whistleblowers that will come before this Court.
16

See e.g. Bechtel v. Competitive Tech. Inc., 448 F.3d at 73-74; Bernabel and Zuckerman,
supra note 6, at 1; infra notes 180-202 and accompanying discussion.
17

See Cong. Rec., S7418-S7421, July 26, 2002; infra notes 54-58 and accompanying
discussion.
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Part I: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
A. The Whistleblower Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
1. Overview
The whistleblower protections in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200218 provide in
Section 80619 in pertinent part:20
Sec. 806. Protection for Employees of Publicly Traded Companies Who Provide
Evidence of Fraud.
1514A. Civil action to protect against retaliation in fraud cases
(a)Whistleblower Protection For Employees of Publicly Traded Companies - No
company with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78l), or that is required to file reports under
section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o(d)), or any
officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such company, may
discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate
against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment because of any
lawful act done by the employee—
(1) to provide information, cause information to be provided, or otherwise assist
in an investigation regarding any conduct which the employee reasonably believes
constitutes a violation of section 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule or regulation
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law
relating to fraud against shareholders, when the information or assistance is
provided to or the investigation is conducted by—
(A)
a Federal regulatory or law enforcement agency;
(B)
any Member of Congress or any committee of Congress; or

18

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 , 116 Stat. 745 (codified at
various sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C); see supra note 1 and accompanying
discussion.
19

18 U.S.C. s.1514A (2002).

20

Sarbanes-Oxley requires publicly traded companies to convene standing audit
committees composed of independent directors and at least one financial expert. These
committees have the power to hire, compensate and fire the corporation’s auditors.
These committees are also charged with establishing procedures for handling
whistleblower complaints. 15 U.S.C.A. s. 78j-1.
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(C) a person with supervisory authority over the employee (or such other
person working for the employer who has the authority to investigate,
discover, or terminate misconduct); or
(2) to file, cause to be filed, testify, participate in, or otherwise assist in a
proceeding filed or about to be filed (with any knowledge of the employer)
relating to an alleged violation of section 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule or
regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision of
Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders.
Sarbanes-Oxley thus provides redress to an employee wronged under the Act in
that an employee may bring an enforcement action by filing a complaint with the
Department of Labor within 90 days of the alleged wrongful action21 by the employer.22
The employee, if successful, is entitled to such relief as is necessary to make him whole,

21

What constitutes “wrongful” action for purposes of the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower
provisions is discussed later in the article. See infra notes 122-24 and accompanying
discussion.
22

18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b). The Department of labor has at times broadly construed the Act
to meet its remedial purpose, allowing in appropriate cases, the equitable tolling of the
90-day period that a complainant has to file his claim for relief. See Lerbs v. Buca Di
Beppo, Inc., Case No. 2004-SOX-8 at 4 (ALJ Dec. 30, 2003). On the other hand, the
Department of Labor has at times strictly construed the Act, requiring that the “named
person” (the employer) be a “publicly traded company” within the meaning of the statute,
and disallowing a claim where the respondent employer had initially filed a registration
statement, but had not later been required to file public financial reports pursuant to
federal securities laws. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b); Flake v. New World Pasta Co., Case
No. 2003-SOX-00018, at 5 (ALJ July 7, 2003) (holding that respondent employer was
not a “publicly traded company” within Sarbanes-Oxley since it had not filed certain
public financial reports). Likewise, the Department of Labor has consistently held that
Sarbanes-Oxley will not be retroactively applied where the “protected activity” and
“adverse employment action” were taken prior to the effective date of the Act. Gilmore
v. Parametric Tech., Case No. 2003-SOX 00001 at 6 (ALJ Feb. 6, 2003); Greenwald v.
UBS Paine Webber, Inc., Case No. 2003-SOX-2, at 1 (ALJ April 17, 2003); 18 U.S.C. §
1514A(b).
The Act is still relatively new and it remains to be seen how the Department of
Labor will treat whistleblowers in the long-term, but a definite trend can already be
observed in the Department’s “defense-leaning tendency.” See infra notes 180-202 and
accompanying discussion.

-7-

including back pay, reinstatement,23 and compensatory damages.24 While initially, the
statute specifically provided that any action for relief would be governed by the burdens
of proof previously applicable to the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform
Act for the 21st Century (“AIR 21”)25 and initially adopted the rules and procedures from
AIR 21; 26 in December 2004, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration issued
final rules and procedures for the specific handling of discrimination complaints under
Sarbanes-Oxley.27

23

But see infra and supra notes 144-45, 147 and accompanying discussion.
Reinstatement might include economic reinstatement or reinstatement to the
complainant’s actual job depending on the circumstances of the case. 69 Fed.Reg. at
52107.
24

18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c).

25

49 U.S.C. s. 42121(b) (“AIR 21”).

26

18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b). The procedures and burden of proof made expressly applicable
to a Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower complaint originate in 49 U.S.C. s. 42121(b).
27

29 CFR Part 1980 (Procedures for the Handling of Discrimination Complaints Under
Section 806 of the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, Title VIII
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; Final Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 52104 (August 24, 2004).
Since these procedures and the language of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are similar to those
found in AIR 21 (Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st
Century, 49 U.S.C. s. 42121(b)(“AIR 21”)) the ERA (The Energy Reorganization Act,
42 U.S.C. 5851 (b)(3)(D) (“ERA”)), and the Surface Transportation Assistance Act
(“STAA”) and because cases under Sarbanes-Oxley are still limited, cases under AIR 21,
STAA, and the ERA are discussed in this article where applicable. See Halloum v. Intel
Corp., Case No. 2003-SOX-0007, at 10 (ALJ Mar. 4, 2004)(noting that the implementing
regulations for Sarbanes-Oxley are patterned after the ERA, the STAA, and AIR 21); see
also supra notes 25-26 and accompanying discussion.
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2. Procedural Framework for Whistleblower Proceedings Under Sarbanes-Oxley
The rules and procedures detail the handling of a Sarbanes-Oxley complaint from
inception to hearing and appeal.28 From the outset, the statute itself thus calls for an
investigation; a preliminary order of reinstatement29 if there is a “reasonable cause” to
believe the complaint has merit, and a hearing, if requested by either party.30
The procedures further provide that a “[c]omplaint will be dismissed if it fails to make a
prima facie showing that protected behavior or conduct was a contributing factor in the
unfavorable personnel action alleged in the complaint.”31
The initial procedures only require a complainant to raise an inference that his
protected conduct was a contributing factor in the employer’s decision.32 If he does this,
then an investigation of the claim will proceed, unless the employer can show by clear
and convincing evidence that it had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for
terminating the complainant.33 Since the Sarbanes-Oxley administrative procedure was

28

29 CFR Part 1980 (Procedures for the Handling of Discrimination Complaints Under
Section 806 of the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, Title VIII
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; Final Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 52104 (August 24, 2004).
29

See also infra notes 144-45 and accompanying discussion.

30

18 U.S.C. s. 1514A (b)(2) (adopting 49 U.S.C. s. 42121(b)).

31

69 Fed. Reg. at 52106.

32

69 Fed. Reg. at 52106. In typical discrimination cases, an inference of discrimination
is shown by offering evidence that the employer treated the complainant in a disparate
manner. Adams v. Zucker Ent., Inc., 2005 WL 1397551 (Iowa Ct. of App, June 15,
2005).
33

69 Fed. Reg. at 52106. Once the complaint is filed, the Assistant Secretary must notify
the Respondent, also known as the “named person.” 69 Fed. Reg. at 52106; see also 18
U.S.C. § 1514A(a).
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designed to be an expedited proceeding,34 the rules state that a Respondent has 20 days
from receipt of the complaint to meet with OSHA and present evidence in support of its
position.35 The procedures do not provide for the OSHA investigator to share this
evidence with the complainant.36 If the OSHA investigator has “reasonable cause” to
believe that the “[n]amed person [the respondent employer] has violated the Act, and
therefore that preliminary relief for the complainant is warranted, OSHA again contacts
the named person with notice of this determination.”37 The rules then require that the
named person be given ten business days to provide written evidence, meet with the
investigator and provide legal and factual arguments arguing against a preliminary award
of relief.38 Again, the procedures do not give the complainant a commiserate right to

34

See 69 Fed. Reg. at 52107.

35

69 Fed. Reg. at 52106.

36

See 69 Fed. Reg. at 52106-07.

37

69 Fed.Reg. at 52106.

38

69 Fed.Reg. at 52107. This section of the Sarbanes-Oxley regulations was designed to
provide due process protection to the Respondent in accord with the United States
Supreme Court’s decision under the whistleblower provisions of the STAA. Brock v.
Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252 (1987). While this section may also provide due
process to the complainant who may not be in danger of suffering direct deprivation of
property at the hands of the government, see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261, 90
S.Ct. 1011, 1017 (1970), this section certainly tips the balance in favor of the employer
by allowing only the respondent to submit written evidence and to at least a rudimentary
hearing with the investigator prior to a preliminary determination. See Goldberg, 397
U.S. at 267, 90 S.Ct. at 1020. As is discussed later in this article, lengthening the
procedure will favor the employer in most instances. See also infra notes 39, 203-08,
269-278 and accompanying discussion.
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meet with the OSHA investigator or to provide written evidence arguing in favor of a
preliminary award for relief.39
Within 60 days of the filing to the complaint, the investigator is to make a
determination on behalf of the Assistant Secretary that preliminary relief is warranted or
that the complaint lacks merit.40 If the Assistant Secretary determines that preliminary
relief is warranted, he may order that the employee be reinstated.41 Either party may file
objections to the preliminary determination of the Assistant Secretary within 30 days of
receipt of the investigator’s findings and request a hearing before an administrative law
judge (“ALJ”).42
At the hearing on the objections to the preliminary determination of the Assistant
Secretary, an employee bringing a Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower claim must ultimately
show by a preponderance of the evidence43 that: (1) he engaged in protected activity

39

See 69 Fed. Reg. at 52106-07. Prior to their finalization, the “Government
Accountability Project” argued that the implementing rules for Sarbanes-Oxley were
biased in favor of the employer. See 69 Fed. Reg. at 52107.
40

69 Fed.Reg. at 52108. The Assistant Secretary has not consistently made a
determination within the 60-day deadline. See infra note 48 and accompanying
discussion; 69 Fed.Reg. at 52108.
41

The validity and enforceability of an investigator’s order of reinstatement has been
called into question by the Second Circuit’s May 1, 2006 decision in Bechtel. See
Bechtel v. Competitive Tech. Inc., 448 F.3d at 472-75; see also infra and supra notes 14445, 147 and accompanying discussion.
42

18 U.S.C. s. 1514A((b)(2) (adopting 49 U.S.C. s. 42121 (b)((2)); 69 Fed.Reg. at 52108.

43

The Unites States Supreme Court’s McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis
closely parallels the AIR 21 test for determining whether a whistleblower under
Sarbanes-Oxley can initially make out a prima facie case. See infra notes 59-65 and
accompanying discussion. Halloum v. Intel Corp., Case No. 2003-SOX-7, at 9-10 (ALJ
March 4, 2004), aff’d ARB Case No. 04-068 (Jan. 31, 2006)(ALJ discussing McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)(applying a
burden shifting analysis to discrimination complaints under Title VII of the Civil Rights
- 11 -

under Sarbanes-Oxley; (2) that the employer was aware of the protected activity; (3) that
he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that the protected activity was likely a
contributing factor in the employer’s decision to take adverse action.44 Since there is
seldom direct evidence of discrimination against a whistleblower, whistleblowing
employees may prove a nexus between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action inferentially.45
After a hearing, the ALJ will issue a decision in the matter and the ALJ’s decision
will become the final decision of the Secretary of Labor unless a timely petition for
review is filed with the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”).46 Sarbanes-Oxley
further provides that if the Secretary of Labor has not issued a final decision within 180
days of the initial filing by the employee, the employee may bring an appropriate action
for de novo review and appropriate relief in federal court.47

Act of 1964). The analysis is instructive on the ultimate question as to whether a
complainant can prove illegal retaliatory action. Halloum, 2003-SOX-7 at 9; infra notes
59 to 65 and accompanying discussion.
44

Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., Case No. 2003-SOX-15, at 34 (ALJ Jan. 28,
2004) (citing Macktal v. U.S. Dept’t of Labor, 171 F.3d 1137 (Fed. Cr. 1993); Zinn v.
University of Missouri, 1993 – ERA –34 (Sec’y. Jan. 18, 1996). Each of the elements of
a Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower claim is discussed in detail in this article. See infra
notes 67-124 and accompanying discussion.
45

Woodman v. WWOR TV, Inc. 411 F.3d 69, 83 (2nd Cir. 2005)(noting that direct
evidence of discrimination is not required in an age discrimination case under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and that discrimination can be shown with circumstantial
evidence); Richards, Case No. 2004-SOX-00049, at 13; Getman v. Southwest Sec., Inc.,
Case No. 2003-SOX-0008, at 15 (ALJ Feb. 2, 2004)(seldom direct evidence of intent)
rev’d on other grounds, ARB 04-059 (ARB July 29, 2005); see infra notes 220-24 and
accompanying discussion.

46

69 Fed.Reg. at 521111.

47

18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b); 69 Fed.Reg. at 52111. The complainant can bring an action in
federal court for de novo review of his complaint if there is no showing that the
- 12 -

The catch in all of these carefully crafted procedures is that they are not being
closely followed.48 Most Sarbanes-Oxley cases are lingering longer then the mandated
180 days.49 While overall, these dispute processes may not be inordinately long in the
context of the U.S. judicial and administrative dispute resolution systems, they are too
long to achieve Congress’s goal of protecting whistleblowing workers and preventing
corporations from retaliating against them. Indeed, the ordinary employee cannot afford
a long period without a paycheck.50 If losing his livelihood without appropriate

Secretary’s failure to issue a final decision is not due to the bad faith of the complainant.
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b). In Murray v. TXU Corp., the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Texas held that while failing to comply with procedures in the C.F.R. and “not
holding the Secretary’s feet to the irons” might delay a decision, such falls “far short” of
showing that the plaintiff acted in bad faith. Murray v. TXU Corp., 279 F. Supp.2d 799,
804 (N.D. Tex. 2003). In Murray, the court was willing to hear complainant’s case de
novo. Murray, 279 F.Supp.2d at 804. Additionally, the right to file in federal court is not
absolute even if the complainant has acted in good faith. A federal court may refuse to
hear a whistleblower case on a de novo basis if it would not be an efficient use of
resources to do so. In other words, if the Department of Labor has expanded significant
resources on a matter and appears close to making a decision, a federal court can exercise
its discretionary right to refuse to take the matter into its jurisdiction. Cite Finally, the
District Court may take judicial notice of the administrative record in a Sarbanes-Oxley
proceeding that has been removed to its jurisdiction. McClendon v. Hewlett-Packard
Co., WL 2847224 (D. Idaho 2005) (noting administrative proceeding at McClendon v.
Hewlett-Packard Co., 2005-SOX-3 (ALJ).
48

See http://www.oalj.dol.gov (cataloguing and digesting cases by date); see e.g.,
McIntyre v. Merrill. Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., ARB 2003-SOX-23, (ARB
July 27, 2005)(Final Decision & Order filed); Willy v. Ameriton Properties, Inc., Case
No. 2003-SOX-9 (June 27, 2003)(discussing steps taken in the proceedings); Halloum v.
Intel Corp., 2003-SOX-7 (ARB Jan. 31, 2006)(Final decision and order approximately
three years after initial complaint); Getman v. Southwest Sec., Inc., ARB 2003-SOX-8
(ARB July 29, 2005)(Final Decision & Order approximately two years after initial
complaint).
49

See supra note 48 and accompanying discussion.

50

Brock v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 258-59, 107 S.Ct. 1740 (1987) (noting that
the eventual potential recovery of backpay may not be enough incentive to encourage
reporting of violations).
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protection is to be the consequence of his “whistleblowing,” the employee simply will
choose not to report what he reasonably perceives as violations of federal securities
laws.51 If he does report, a prolonged waiting period will in turn encourage corporations,
who know that there is no reason to expect a prompt administrative response to adverse
action against whistleblowers, to gloss over or cover up their wrongdoing, instead of
correcting it. If the legislative thinking behind an expedited proceeding was to encourage
and protect whistleblowers that find themselves out of work, and to compel companies to
take their complaints seriously – and it surely was52 – such planning is not coming to
fruition when proceedings to correct retaliation against whistleblowing employees take a
year or more to resolve.53
3. The Legislative History of Sarbanes-Oxley and Legislative Intent
In a section-by-section analysis of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Senate indeed
reported that the purpose of the whistleblower protection contained in Section 806 was to
provide federal protection to employees that report evidence of fraud to supervisors or
federal officials.54 The protections were intended to ensure that companies take such
complaints seriously and avoid the temptation to sweep such complaints under the
boardroom rugs.

51

See Brock, 481 U.S. at 258-59, 107 S.Ct. 1740.

52

See Bechtel v. Competitive Tech. Inc., 448 F.3d at 484 – 85 (dissenting opinion); infra
notes 54-58, 145-148 and accompanying discussion.
53

See supra note 48 and accompanying discussion.

54

Cong. Rec., S7418-S7421, July 26, 2002; 18 U.S.C. § 1514A .
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The Senate noted that prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, employees reporting fraud had to
rely on the “vagaries” of state law for protection.55 The Senate further noted that most
corporate employers knew exactly what they could do within state law to avoid a suit by
a whistleblowing employee.56 The Senate’s report also states that U.S. laws need to
encourage and protect those who report fraudulent activity that can “damage innocent
investors in publicly traded companies.”57 The whistleblower provisions of SarbanesOxley were thus touted as the “single must effective measure possible to prevent
recurrence of the Enron debacle and similar threats to the nation’s financial markets.”58
Part II: Whistleblower Cases Decided By the Department of Labor and Federal Courts
A. Introduction
At a hearing on the merits of a Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower claim, an
administrative law judge will employ a burden shifting analysis that is similar to, but not

55

Cong. Rec., S7418-S7421, July 26, 2002. For example, New York’s whistleblower
law only protects employees that report an actual violation of a law or regulation and
only if the violation creates a specific danger to the public health or safety. McKinney’s
Labor Law s. 740 (1984). Indeed, in New York, an employee who reports corporate
fraud has no state law protection against retaliation. See Bordell v. General Electric Co. ,
88 N. Y. 2d 869, 871, 644 N.Y.S. 2d 912, 913(1996); see also Sandra Mullings, Is There
Whistleblower Protection of Private Employees in New York? 69 Feb. N.Y. St. B.J. 36,
37 (Feb. 1997) (noting that as of 1997, only 16 states had whistleblower statutes and only
ten of them protected employees when they had a reasonable belief that a statute or rule
had been violated and that in the other six states, whistleblowing employees have to show
that they have reported an actual violation of state law or regulation).
56

Cong. Rec., S7418-S7421, July 26, 2002. Anecdotally, it has been reported that within
48 hours after Sherron Watkins of Enron wrote her whistleblowing memo to Ken Lay,
the Chairman of Enron, he was given a memo that indicated that Ms. Watkins could be
fired and that she was not protected under state law. Robert Prentice, Student Guide to
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Thomson West Publishing, at 53 (2005).
57

Cong. Rec., S7418-S7421, July 26, 2002.

58

Cong. Rec., S7418-S7421, July 26, 2002.
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exactly like, the burden shifting analysis laid down by the United States Supreme Court
in McDonnell Douglas v. Green.59 In a hearing, the whistleblower must first prove each
of the elements of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence.60 If he meets this
burden, the employer may still defend if it can prove with clear and convincing evidence
that it had a legitimate non-discriminatory motive for its personnel action and it would
have taken the same action even if complainant had not engaged in the protected
activity.61 The complainant can ultimately prevail at a hearing if he can then show by a

59

See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying discussion. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). In McDonnell Douglas, the
United States Supreme Court held that a discrimination plaintiff in a Title VII
discrimination case would bear the initial burden to prove the elements of his prima facie
case by a preponderance of the evidence. 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. If he were
able to meet this burden, the burden would shift to the employer to articulate a legitimate
reason for its actions. Halloum, Case No. 2003-SOX-0007, at 10. If the employer could
succeed in this relatively low burden, the employer could then still succeed if he could
prove that the employer’s reason was a mere pretext. 411 U.S. at 807, 93 S.Ct. at 1827;
see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142, 120 S.Ct.
2097, 2106, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (noting that employer in discrimination case has
mere burden to produce, not persuade as to its legitimate reasons for acting). These
burdens are different in Sarbanes-Oxley wherein an employer is required to prove (rather
than articulate or produce under McDonnell Douglas) by clear and convincing evidence a
legitimate reason for its adverse action against an employee. Halloum, Case No. 2003SOX-0007, at 10; see McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824.
60

Halloum, Case No. 2003-SOX-0007, at 10. A Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower claim is
heard at trial de novo. At a hearing, there is no need to decide whether the complainant
has made out a “prima facie” case as this finding is related to procedural dismissal at the
investigative stage of a proceeding. Halloum, Case No. 2003-SOX-0007, at 10. The
Halloum court noted that while the McDonnell Douglas model of analysis was not
exactly the same as the required analysis under Sarbanes-Oxley, the “McDonnell Douglas
model nonetheless serves as an analytical tool to help determine the ultimate issue of
whether Complainant suffered forbidden discrimination.” Halloum, Case No. 2003SOX-0007, at 10; see supra notes 58-59 and accompanying discussion.
61

Welch, Case No. 2003-SOX-15, at 37. The courts have recognized that the “clear and
convincing evidence” standard is higher than a preponderance of the evidence, but lower
than beyond a reasonable doubt. Id (citing Yule v. Burns Int’l Security Serv., case No.
1993-ERA-12 (Sec’y. May 24, 1995); Halloum, Case No. 2003-SOX-0007, at 10; see
- 16 -

preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s stated legitimate reason is not the real
reason, but a “pretext” for the discriminatory action.62 A complainant can show pretext
by showing that the Respondent lacks credibility63 or that the protected activity
influenced the employer to take adverse action against the employee.64 The complainant
bears the ultimate burden of showing that his protected activity contributed to the
employer’s decision to take adverse action against him.65 Each of the elements of the
claim and the defenses are discussed below with citations to representative cases.66
B. Protected Activity
A “whistleblowing” employee67 must first establish that he has engaged in
“protected activity.”68 Within the remedial nature of the statute, “protected activity” is

supra note 126, 128-30 (describing the clear and convincing evidence standard to be
applied in Sarbanes-Oxley cases).
62

Getman, Case No. 2003-SOX-000008 at 18-19, rev’d on other grounds, ARB 04-059
(ARB July 29, 2005).
63

Getman, Case No. 2003-SOX-000008 at 18-19, rev’d on other grounds, ARB 04-059
(ARB July 29, 2005).
64

See infra notes125-30 and accompanying discussion.

65

Halloum, Case No. 2003-SOX-0007, at 10.

66

See infra notes 67-147 and accompanying discussion.

67

As a threshold question, a person making a claim under Sarbanes-Oxley must generally
show that he is an employee of a publicly traded company. 18 U.S.C. s.1514A. In a
landmark decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has held that a
person is not an “employee” of a publicly traded company within the Act if he is foreign
worker employed by an overseas subsidiaries of a publicly traded U.S. company. Canero
v. Boston Scientific Corp., Civ. No. 04-1801 (1st Cir. 2006); Beck v. Citicorp., Inc., Case
No. 2006-SOX-00003 (August 1, 2006) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction where
the complainant was employed in Germany when the adverse action took place).
68

Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., Case No. 2003-SOX-15, at 34 (citing Macktal v.
U.S. Dept’t of Labor, 171 F.3d 1137 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). In Welch, the ALJ issued a
- 17 -

broadly defined to include the reporting of information: to Congress, any investigative
agency of the federal government or a supervisor at the employer itself; that the employee
reasonably believes relates to federal securities, mail, wire or other fraud, a violation of
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) rules or any other fraud against the
shareholders.69 The courts and the administrative tribunals within the U.S. Department of
Labor70 have held that it is not necessary that the information reported actually amount to
a crime,71 but just that the suspect actions have been committed and are reasonably
believed by the reporting person to be a criminal fraud or other violation of federal
securities law.72

recommended decision and order after a hearing, ordering reinstatement. Welch v.
Cardinal Bankshares Corp., Case No. 2003-SOX-15, at 34 (ALJ Jan. 28, 2004). This
order has yet to be enforced. As of June 9, 2006, however, the Administrative Review
Board held that the order of reinstatement should not be stayed (as requested by the
employer) and that reinstatement should proceed, but that it could include economic
reinstatement. Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., ARB Case No. SOX-06-062 (ARB
June 9, 2006). It has been more than two years since the ALJ’s decision in Welch and
complainant still had not had any relief as of June 2006. Id.
69

18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b).

70

See Barnes v. Raymond James Associates, Case No. 2004-SOX-58, at 7(ALJ January
10, 2005) (complainant did not prove her reasonable belief that information reported
constituted violation of law).
71

In Getman v. Southwest Sec., Inc., the ARB reversed the ALJ’s holding and held that
complainant Getman, a financial analyst at Southwest, had not engaged in “protected
activity” when she publicly refused to change a stock rating. Getman v. Southwest, Inc.,
ARB Case No. 04-059 (ARB July 29, 2005)(reversing Case No. 2003-SOX-0008 (ALJ
Feb. 2, 2004)).
72

Collins v. Beazer, 334 F.Supp.2d 1365, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 2004)(citing Passaic Valley
Sewerage Comm’rs v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 992 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1993)); see 18
U.S.C. § 1514A(c).
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Thus, in Collins v. Beazer, plaintiff brought her case in federal district court73
under Sarbanes-Oxley based on her “reasonable belief” that a violation of federal
securities laws or regulations had occurred.74 Plaintiff, a director of marketing at a public
company called Beazer Homes USA, Inc., reported that the division in which she worked
was knowingly overpaying and engaging in business with an outside person because of a
personal relationship between management and the outside person; that a manager was
overpaying sales agents who were the manager’s personal friends; and that there were
“kickbacks” being paid for lumber purchases.75
The court noted that the plaintiff was not required to show an “actual violation” of
federal securities law, but only that she ‘‘reasonably believed” that there was a violation
of one of the federal laws or regulations enumerated in Sarbanes-Oxley.76 The court
noted further that this standard is intended to encompass all good faith reporting by

Plaintiff Collins first filed her case with the Department of Labor and then later
removed her case to the federal district court for the Northern District of Georgia when
the Secretary did not make a final determination within the required 180 days. See
Collins, 334 F.Supp.2d at 1371-72.
73

74

Collins, 334 F.Supp.2d at 1376.

75

Collins, 334 F.Supp.2d at 1377.

76

Collins, 334 F.Supp,.2d at 1376 (citing Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm’rs v. United
States Dep’t of Labor, 992 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1993)). This reasonableness test imposes an
objective standard on a normal reasonable person; a standard that has been interpreted in
many different legal contexts. Legislative History of Title VIII of HR 2673: The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Cong. Rec. S7418, S7420 (daily ed. July 26, 2002); Collins,
334 F.Supp2d at 1376. “The threshold is intended to include all good faith and reasonable
reporting of fraud, and there should be no presumption that reporting is otherwise, absent
specific evidence.” The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Cong. Rec. S7418, S7420 (daily
ed. July 26, 2002) (citing Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm’rs v. United States Dep’t of
Labor, 992 F.2d 474, (3d Cir. 1993)).
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employees,77 and that given the “broad remedial nature” of Sarbanes-Oxley, it is not
necessary for a plaintiff to identify the specific code section he believes the corporation
has violated.78 Defendant could not thus win summary judgment simply by asserting that
Collins’ claims were too vague and did not rise to the level of those proffered by Sherron
Watkins in the Enron debacle.79
Similarly, other cases have noted that an employee can engage in “protected
activity” under Sarbanes-Oxley by reporting alleged securities law violations within the
company to a person or body in a supervisory role.80 Thus, In Richards v. Lexmark, the
complainant reported that problems existed with inventory accounting to his direct
supervisor,81 reasonably believing that such accounting problems amounted to violations
of federal and state anti-fraud laws.82 The administrative law judge rejected respondent

77

Collins, 334 F.Supp.2d at 1376.

78

Collins, 334 F.Supp.2d at 1377. However, in Reddy v. Medquist, Inc.,, Case No. 2004SOX – 35, at 8-9, ARB Case No. SOX 04-123 (ARB Sept. 30, 2005), the administrative
review board found that the complainant, a medical transcriptionist, who had complained
about the irregular “counting” of her lines for purposes of her pay did not amount to
protected activity under the relevant whistleblower statute. Reddy Case No. 2004-SOX –
35, ARB Case No. SOX 04-123, at 8-9.
79

Collins, 334 F.Supp.2d at 1376; see supra note 76 and accompanying discussion.

80

Richards v. Lexmark International, Inc., Case No. 2004-SOX-00049 at 14; see Collins,
334 F.Supp2d at 13777-78. The statute protects internal reposting as long as reports are
made to “a person with supervisory authority over the employee.” 18 U.S.C.A. s.
1501A(a)(1)(C) (2002).

81

Richards, Case No., 2004-SOX-00049, at 3.

82

Richards, Case No. 2004-SOX-00049, at 14.
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Lexmark’s motion for summary judgment urging that Richard’s reports of accounting
problems at Lexmark were not “protected activity” within Sarbanes-Oxley.83
The Richards decision raises interesting and as yet unanswered questions under
Sarbanes-Oxley about whether an employee must report his suspicions to someone other
than his immediate supervisor. For example, where an employee innocently reports
suspected violations to his superior and then his superior turns out to have been involved
in the fraud, does this involvement change the employee’s status in some way: was he
still engaged in good faith reporting?84 Does the fact that an employee’s reporting which
was done in good faith, but in hindsight appears to have gone into the “black hole” of his
corrupt immediate supervisor85 affect the application of the Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblower provisions?86 The author is not aware of any reported cases dealing with
these kinds of entirely plausible factual scenarios and the trigger of Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblower protections.
Finally, while the Collins and Richards courts appeared to take an expansive view
of reporting activity,87 other more recent cases present a troubling judicial view of what is
protected reporting under Sarbanes-Oxley.88 These courts limit the definition of “fraud”

83

Richards, Case No. 2004-SOX-00049, at 14.

84

See Richards, Case No. 2004-SOX-00049, at 14.

85

See Richards, Case No. 2004-SOX-00049 at 3; Dan W. Goldfine, “Plan Ahead Before
Trouble Walks In,” 13 Aug. Bus. L. Today 27 (July/August 2004) (discussing situations
where company counsel and/or management may be involved in wrongdoing).
86

See e.g., Collins, 334 F.Supp.2d at 1376; Richards, Case No. 2004-SOX-00049 at 14.

87

See Collins, 334 F.Supp.2d at 1376.

88

See, e.g.. Bishop v. PCS Admin. (USA) Inc., No. 05-c-5683, 2006 WL 1460032, at 9
(N.D. Ill. May 23, 2006)); Wengender v. Robert Half Int’l. Inc., Case No. 2005-SOX-59,
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under Sarbanes-Oxley to reporting that raises specific concerns about shareholder fraud
vis a vis, federal law.89 In turn, at least one of these cases limits Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblower provisions so that reports about potential SEC violations would not trigger
whistleblower protection.90
C. Employer Must be Aware of Employee’s Protected Activity
The second element of a whistleblower case is that the employer must be aware of
the employee’s protected activity when it takes adverse action against the employee.91 If
an employee, for example, reported to the federal government unbenounced to the
corporate employer and then the employer acted against the employee, the employee
could not then claim retaliation under the Act. Cases have held that constructive or actual
knowledge, however, will be sufficient to satisfy the “knowledge” element of the claim.92

at 15 (ALJ March 30, 2006); cf. Klopfenstein v. PCC Flow Tech. Holdings, Inc., ARB
No. SOX 04-149, Case No. 2004-SOX-11 (ARB May 31, 2006); Walton v. Nova Info.
Sys. and Bancorp, Case No. 2005-SOX-107, at 3 (ALJ March 29, 2006).
89

See Bishop v. PCS Admin. (USA) Inc., NO. 05-c-5683, 2006 WL 1460032, at 9 (N.D.
Ill. May 23, 2006)); Wengender v. Robert Half Int’l. Inc., 2005-SOX-59, at 15 (ALJ
March 30, 2006); cf. Klopfenstein v. PCC Flow Tech. Holdings, Inc., ARB NO. 04-149,
ALJ NO. 2004-SOX-11 (ARB May 31, 2006); Walton v. Nova Info. Sys. and Bancorp,
2005-SOX-107, at 3.
90

See, e.g.. Wengender v. Robert Half Int’l. Inc., 2005-SOX-59, at 15 (ALJ March 30,
2006).
91

Richards, Case No. 2004-SOX-00049 at 12.

92

See, e.g. Henrich, Case No. 2004-SOX-00051, at 9 (ALJ Nov. 23, 2004); but see
Anderson v. Jaro Transp. Serv. and McGowan Excavating, Inc., ARB Case No. 05-011,
at 6 (ARB Nov. 30, 2005) (noting that complainant’s immediate supervisor did not know
about his protected activity until after she fired him as a basis for the employer’s defense
even where company that hired complainant knew of protected activity).
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While simple enough in theory, the question of who has knowledge when they act
against an employee sometimes contains intricacies not accounted for in the statute or the
cases decided to date. For example, does a corporate board of directors have constructive
knowledge when it terminates a whistleblowing employee, and what about counsel to the
board or the corporation; can they have constructive knowledge of whistleblowing
activity sufficient to make the respondent liable under Sarbanes-Oxley? In any event, the
U.S. Department of Labor has made it clear that an employer may not use a “straw-man”
to take retaliatory action against employees,93 and that “constructive knowledge can be
attributed to the ultimate decision-makers94 where the complainant’s immediate
supervisor had actual knowledge of complainant’s protected activities.”95
In some cases, however, the employer may really not know that the employee has
filed a complaint outside the company and thus it would not be proper to find a basis for
retaliatory discrimination.96 Where an inference can be drawn that the employer did
know that the employee had made a report of illegal activity, the Department of Labor
has held that the employee will have met its burden to prove this element of the claim.97
93

Henrich, Case No: 2004-SOX-00051, at 9 (November 23, 2004); Platone v. Atlantic
Coast Airlines, Case No. 2003-SOX-27, at 26 (ALJ April 30, 2004).
94

But see Anderson, ARB Case No. 05-011, at 6 (noting that immediate supervisory
company lacked knowledge of protected activity, even where company that hired it to do
work did know of complaint).
95

Henrich, Case No. 2004-SOX-00051, at 9.

96

Peck v. Safe Air Int’l, Inc., ARB No. 02-028, ALJ No. 2001-AIR-3 (ARB Jan. 30,
2004) (ARB found that two managers ultimately responsible for firing of employee did
not know about employee’s complaint to the Federal Aviation Administration under AIR
21).
97

Lederhaus v. Donald Paschen & Midwest Inspect. Serv., LTD., Case No. 91-ERA-13,
at 3 (ALJ Oct. 26, 1992).
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D. Protected Activity Was a “Contributing Factor” in Adverse Employment
Action___________________________________________________
Perhaps the most significant and most difficult factor to prove in a SarbanesOxley whistleblower case is the “contributing factor” element, or the causation element
of the claim.98 Administrative law judges in the Department of Labor have repeatedly
discussed this element of an employee’s claim in Sarbanes-Oxley decisions and in other
whistleblower actions under statutes similar to Sarbanes-Oxley, but have not made it
clear what exactly an employee must do to meet his burden.99 In reported cases, the
tribunals have noted that the law specifically does not require an employee to prove that
his protected activity was a “motivating or “significant” factor in the decision to take
adverse action against him.100
The words a “contributing factor” …means any factor which, alone or in
connection with other factors, tends to affect in any way the outcome of the
decision. This test is specifically intended to overrule existing case law, which
requires a whistleblower to prove that his protected conduct was a “significant,”
“motivating,” “substantial,” or “predominant,” factor in a personnel action in
order to overturn that action.101

98

Marano v. Dep’t of Justice, 2 F.3d 1137, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (employee had to prove
that protected activity was a “contributing factor” in employer’s adverse decision under
whistleblower act for federal employees).
99

The ERA, the STAA and AIR are similar to Sarbanes-Oxley in procedures and proof.
See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying discussion; see infra notes 109-110 and
accompanying discussion.
100

Marano v. Dep’t of Justice, 2 F.3d at 1140 (previously the standard under the Federal
Whistleblower Act); see Platone, Case No. 2003-SOX-27, at 26.

101

Marano v. Dep’t of Justice, 2 F.3d 1137, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (interpreting the
whistleblower provisions of 5 U.S.C. s. 1214(b)(4)(B)(ii); 5 U.S.C. s.1221(e)). The
court specifically noted that this test specifically overruled existing case law requiring the
whistleblower to show that his protected conduct was a “’significant,’ ‘motivating,’
‘substantial,’ or ‘predominant’ factor in a personnel action.” Id.
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Rather, a whistleblower need only show that his protected activity had a role in the
decision to act adversely toward him.102 For reasons discussed below, this element of a
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower claim presents particular evidentiary challenges for
employees claiming retaliatory action under the Act.103
Initially at least, suffice it to say, it is difficult for an employee to prove by direct
evidence that his protected activity was a contributing factor in his termination.104
The U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Administrative Law Judges, has held that where
an adverse action closely follows a report made by an employee, the “sequence of
events” can support an inference of causation.105 More broadly, the Department of Labor
has held that “temporal proximity between the protected activities and the adverse action
may be sufficient to establish the inference that the protected activity was a motivation
for the adverse action.”106 In at least one case, temporal proximity has been interpreted to

102

See Marano,, 2 F.3d at 1140; Platone, Case No. 2003-SOX-27, at 26.

103

See e.g. Henrich v. Ecolab, Inc., Case No. 2004- SOX-00051, at 10 (noting that
complainant had not proved that his protected activities were a contributing factor in his
termination). Robinson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., ARB Case No. 04-041 (ARB Nov.
30, 2005)(in AIR 21 case, court held that because six months had passed since the
complainant had written a letter detailing security violations to the Federal Aviation
Authority, and the adverse action, and because complainant had engaged in questionable
conduct during that six month period, letter detailing security violations was not
contributing factor in employer’s decision to take adverse action against complainant).
104

See Stone and Webster Eng’g Corp. v. Herman, 115 F.3d 1568, 1573, 1575 (11th Cir.
1997) (in reviewing Secretary’s decision for substantial evidence, court noted that direct
evidence of retaliation was not available in ERA whistleblower case).

105

Lederhaus, 91-ERA-13, at 4.

106

Thomas v. Arizona Pub. Serv.,, 89-ERA-19, at 9 (Sec’y). Sept. 17, 1993). The
Department of Labor has also held close proximity in time of a complainant’s reporting
and his discharge does not require finding of retaliation where the discharge was credibly
“explained by a non-retaliatory motive.” Barnes v. Raymond James and Assoc., Case No.
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mean a period as long as a year between the reporting activities and the adverse action.107
Moreover, in the period before the protected activity (where the complainant is in good
standing) and the protected activity, the employer would be best served in defeating a
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower claim if it could show the occurrence of some intervening
performance event that would justify its adverse action against the employee and could
not possibly be related to the protected activity.108
In Anderson v. Jaro Transportation Services, the complainant reported safety
violations under the STAA,109 a statute similar to Sarbanes-Oxley in procedures and
proof and also governed by the rules of AIR 21.110 The complainant reported that a new
company rule requiring truck drivers to pick up and deliver their loads within six hours

2004-58, at 13 (complainant discharged where supervisor learned she was leaving to
work for a competitor).
107

Thomas, 89-ERA-19, at 9.

108

Getman v. Southwest Sec., Case No. 2003-SOX-0008, rev’d on other grounds, ARB
04-059 (ARB July 29, 2005)(ALJ noting that employer had not indicated that
complainant had performance issues until after she refused to change stock rating and
that respondent’s general dishonesty added to determination that her protected activity
contributed to decision to terminate); but see Bechtel v. Competitive Tech., Inc. Case No.
2005-SOX-00033 at 40-41 (ALJ Oct. 5, 2005)(employee bonus prior to termination not
enough to show “pretext” even when given with an accompanying complimentary note
from management). The administrative court explained that its decision in Bechtel not to
find that the employer had acted on pretext was at least partially based on the fact that the
bonus had been given for work on a specific project. Bechtel v. Competitive Tech., Inc.
Case No. 2005-SOX-00033 at 40-41.
109

Anderson, ARB Case No. 05-011 at 1. The STAA generally prohibits an employer
from taking adverse action against an employee who operates a commercial motor
vehicle for making a safety-related complaint or refusing to operate a vehicle for fear of
serious injury. 49 U.S.C.A. s. 31105 (a)(1)(B)(i),(ii).

110

See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying discussion.
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created a safety issue under STAA.111 Complainant told his supervisor that the new sixhour rule would create safety issues if he picked up loads in the late evening and was too
tired to drive six hours.112 After Anderson reported these concerns, he was warned twice
for being late in delivering loads and for sleeping off the road in his truck.113 In
December 2002, Anderson’s supervisor terminated his employment,114 citing the fact that
between the time of Anderson’s safety complaints and his termination, he had made late
deliveries and had been parking his fully loaded trucks off route.115
Based on these facts, the ARB found that even though the employee had made
safety complaints and he was fired within six months of making such complaints, the
employer had not violated the STAA.116 This was so even though the employer’s
purported legitimate reasons for termination were directly related to the employee’s
safety concerns: actually constituting the basis for his complaints about safety; and even
though the adverse action occurred within six months of the protected activity.117 In
Anderson, the very actions that resulted in his termination, pulling off the road to sleep
and keeping loads longer than the six hours allowed by company rules – were also the

111

Anderson, ARB Case No. 05-011 at 2.

112

Anderson, ARB Case No. 05-011 at 2.

113

Anderson, ARB Case No. 05-011 at 2.

114

Anderson, ARB Case No. 05-011 at 3.

115

Anderson, ARB Case No. 05-011 at 3.

116

See Anderson, ARB Case No. 05-011 at 3, 7.

See Anderson, ARB Case No. 05-011 at 3, 7; see supra notes 25-27 (describing STAA
whistleblower provisions generally).
117
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very subject of complainant’s safety reporting.118 Yet, these actions, according to the
ARB, were sufficient legitimate reasons for the employer’s adverse action; and oddly,
they were enough to show that the employee’s reporting of safety concerns had not been
the causal factor119 in his termination.120 The Anderson case illustrates the extreme uphill
battle a complainant has in proving that his protected activity ultimately was a
contributing factor in the adverse employment action against him.121
E. Adverse Employment Action
The Department of Labor has indicated that any negative employment action will
satisfy this element of a whistleblower claim “if it is reasonably likely to deter employees
from making protected disclosures.”122 A complainant need not prove termination or
suspension from the job, or even a reduction in salary or responsibilities.”123 For

118

See Anderson, ARB Case No. 05-011 at 3.

119

In Anderson, the Administrative Review Board applied a standard of proof slightly
different than that that has been applied under Sarbanes-Oxley. See Anderson, ARB Case
No. 05-011 at 5 (stating that complainant had to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the protected activity was the “reason for the adverse action”). The ARB
effectively held that Anderson had to prove that the employee’s reporting was the causal
factor in the employer’s decision to act adversely toward complainant. Anderson, ARB
Case No. 05-011 at 7.

120

See Anderson, ARB Case No. 05-011 at 3.

121

In addition to finding that Anderson did not prove a causal link between his reporting
and his termination, the ARB found that the employer’s reasons for taking adverse action
were also legitimate – even though they were the same actions that related to Anderson’s
safety complaints. Anderson, ARB Case No. 05-011 at 3, 7-8.

122

The Office of Administrative Law Judges has held however, that a company’s filing
of a lawsuit against an employee is not “protected activity” under the Act. See Vodicka v.
Dobi Med. Int’l, Inc., Case No. 2005-SOX-00111, at 11 (ALJ Dec. 23, 2005).

123

Halloum v. Intel Corp., 2003-SOX-7, at 10.
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example, even being placed on a possible “lay-off” list has been said to qualify as adverse
employment action, even where the employee was not ultimately laid off.124
F. The Employer’s Burden to Rebut
While the employee bears the initial burden of proving the elements of his case by
a preponderance of the evidence under Sarbanes-Oxley,125 the employer can still beat
back the claim of discrimination by proffering “clear and convincing evidence” of
legitimate motives for its adverse actions.126 In such a case, where there exist both
legitimate and illegitimate motives for the adverse action, the court may engage in what
has frequently been called a “dual motive analysis.”127 In these cases, if the employer
can show by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same action in
the absence of the protected activity by the employee,128 the burden will shift back to the

124

Hendrix v. American Airlines, Inc., 2004-AIR-10, 2004-SOX-23 (ALJ Dec. 9, 2003);
see Anderson, ARB Case No. 05-011 at 3 (discussing “blacklisting” by a supervisor, or
disseminating adverse information that affirmatively prevents a person from finding
employment, as a possible adverse employment action and noting that the lower tribunal
had held such conduct to be adverse action within the meaning of the STAA).

125

See supra notes 29-46, 60 and accompanying discussion.

126

See Collins, 334 F. Supp.2d at 1375-76; Welch, Case No.SOX-15, at 44-47, 58
(employer failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that it
would have fired Welch even if he had not engaged in the protected activity); supra note
61 and accompanying discussion.

127

Overall, ARB Nos. 98-111, 98-128, at 33 (ARB Apr. 30 2001)(employer failed to
meet the clear and convincing evidence standard for being “relieved of liability under the
ERA in a dual motive case”); Yule v. Burns Intl. Sec. Serv., Case No. 93-ERA-12, at 4-5
(Sec’y. May 24, 1995) (noting that dual motive analysis applied where illegitimate
motives played part in Burns’ decision).

128

Halloum v. Intel Corp., 2003-SOX-7, at 10; see Thomas v. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., 89ERA-19, at 10 (Sec’y). Sept. 17, 1993)(employer had to prove the existence of legitimate
reason for adverse action by clear and convincing evidence); see also Yule, Case No. 93ERA-12, at 6-7.
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employee to ultimately persuade the trier of fact that the offered reasons are a mere
“pretext” for the real cause of the adverse action: the protected conduct.129 Alternatively,
the employee can show that his conduct was at least a contributing factor in the
employer’s decision to take adverse action.130
Cases where the employer offers what it calls “clear and convincing evidence” of
a legitimate reason for adverse action put the employee in an untenable position.131 In
most instances an employee bringing a Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower claim is also an “at
will” employee who can be fired for just about any reason – at any time – and so most
any reason offered by the employer can be deemed “legitimate” by the tribunal.132 Thus,

129

Bechtel Constr. Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 50 F.3d 926, 934-35 (11th Cir. 1995)
(deciding case under the Energy Reorganization Act containing whistleblower provisions
similar to those contained within in Sarbanes-Oxley, but requiring the employee’s
reporting conduct be a “motivating” factor in the respondent’s decision to terminate). See
supra notes 98-102 and accompanying discussion.
130

Platone, Case No. 2003- SOX-27, at 26 (protected activity played a role in the
decision to terminate complainant).

131

Bechtel v. Competitive Tech., Inc. Case No. 2005-SOX-00033, at 40-41. Bechtel is a
case with a long and tortured history. In Bechtel, the OSHA investigator first found in
favor for the employee and ordered preliminary reinstatement. After a hearing, the
administrative law judge found that the employer had put forth clear and convincing
evidence of a non-discriminatory motivation for termination complainant Bechtel. In the
meantime, the employee had applied to the federal district court for an order requiring the
employer to reinstate the employee complainant. The district court ordered such
reinstatement and the employer appealed the district court decision. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the second Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, issuing a landmark
ruling holding that the preliminary order of reinstatement remedy referred to in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act is most likely not enforceable by a federal court. Bechtel v.
Competitive Tech. Inc., 448 F.3d at 473-75.

132

See Bechtel, Case No. 2005-SOX-00033, at 40-41 (at hearing stage of proceedings,
employee bonus prior to termination not enough to show “pretext” even when given with
an accompanying complimentary note from management). The court explained that its
decision in Bechtel not to find that the employer had acted on pretext was at least
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the level of protection offered to at-will employees by state employment law – as to what
constitutes proper dismissal – is the ultimate determinant of how much protection
whistleblowing employees133 will actually receive under Sarbanes-Oxley.134
In Bechtel v. Competitive Tech., Inc, for example, it appears that the complainant
had been doing at least a reasonably good job prior to the time when he engaged in
“protected activity.”135 With regard to reporting requirements, complainant “raised issues
that he believed needed to be disclosed to the SEC[:]” the “need to report potential
litigation and a change in compensation plan” and the appropriateness of some of
Respondent’s “reorientations.”136 Nonetheless, even after OSHA had ordered that
complainant Bechtel be reinstated137 and even in the face of recent positive
commendations by the employer,138 the ALJ did not find in complainant Bechtel’s favor
at a hearing.139 While the ALJ found that Bechtel’s reporting activities did contribute to

partially based on the fact that the bonus had been given for work on a specific project.
Bechtel v. Competitive Tech., Inc. Case No. 2005-SOX-00033, at 40-41.
133

See e.g. Murphy v. Amer. Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 300 461 N.Y.S.2d 232,
234-35(1983); Wieder v. Skala, 80 N.Y.2d 105, 107, 593 N.Y.S.2d 752, 754 (1992).

134

The level of protection for Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowing claimants does not appear
to be very high to date. See infra notes 180-202 and accompanying discussion regarding
state laws.

135
136

18 U.S.C. s.1514A (a)(1)(2002).
Bechtel v. Competitive Tech., Inc., 2005-SOX-00033, at 36-37.

137

See Bechtel, Case No. 2005-SOX-00033 at 2; but see Bechtel v. Competitive Tech.
Inc., 448 F.3d at 472-74.

138
139

Bechtel v. Competitive Tech., Inc., 2005-SOX-00033, at 39-40.
Bechtel v. Competitive Tech., Inc., Case No. 2005-SOX-00033, at 39.
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his discharge,140 the Respondent was able to put forth “clear and convincing evidence” of
a reason for discharge wholly unrelated to the protected activity.141 Because respondent
was able to point to financial reasons for complainant’s termination – something most
any employer might legitimately claim – complainant was unable to prove that
respondent’s legitimate reasons were pretextual.142 This was the case even where Mr.
Bechtel received a bonus, shares of stock, and positive performance analysis just prior to
his termination.143
In the meantime, Bechtel had already applied to the District Court for
enforcement of the investigator’s preliminary order of reinstatement made before the ALJ
hearing.144 Ultimately, the Second Circuit determined that because the order of
reinstatement was not a “final order,” the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the order.145
Bechtel illustrates again the extreme difficulty a Sarbnes-Oxley complainant has
in proving his case at a hearing where he is an employee at will and where any reason for

140

Bechtel v. Competitive Tech., Inc., Case No. 2005-SOX-00033, at 37.

141

Bechtel v. Competitive Tech., Inc., Case No. 2005-SOX-00033, at 37-39.

142

Bechtel v. Competitive Tech., Inc., Case No. 2005-SOX-00033, at 39-40.

143

Bechtel v. Competitive Tech., Inc., Case No.2005-SOX-00033, at 39-40.

144

Bechtel v. Competitive Tech. Inc., 448 F.3d at 472-73.

145

Bechtel v. Competitive Tech. Inc., 448 F.3d at 472-74. The district court had held the
order of reinstatement order enforceable. 448 F.3d at 473. The circuit court dissent in
Bechtel argued that the majority opinion contravenes the clear intent of Congress.
Bechtel v. Competitive Tech. Inc., 448 F.3d at 484-85. “The language and history of the
Act…evince a strong Congressional preference for reinstatement as a means of
encouraging whistleblowing.” Id.
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his discharge can be viewed as a legitimate one.146 Additionally in Bechtel, the Second
Circuit struck a mighty blow to the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protections in refusing
to enforce the preliminary reinstatement order,147 further discouraging would be
whistleblowers from reporting what they know.
Part III: The Interplay Between Sarbanes-Oxley and Existing State Law: New York, New
Jersey, and Texas Compared________________________________________________
Although Congress sought to improve protections for whistleblowers with
Sarbanes-Oxley,148 most employees involved in whistleblower proceedings will be “atwill” employees. It is this state law “at-will” underpinning that creates the biggest
overall obstacle for whistleblowers under Sarbanes-Oxley and the biggest impediment to
successful implementation of the legislatively stated goal – that of encouraging
employees to openly report evidence of corporate fraud.149
At its most extreme, the doctrine of at-will employment generally provides that an
employee with no set period of employment may be discharged at any time for any
reason except a discriminatory reason.150 In other words, an employee in a state that is
least protective of its employees, may properly be dismissed for “wearing a red shirt.”151
146
147

See infra notes 142-43 and accompanying discussion.
See Bechtel v. Competitive Tech. Inc., 448 F.3d at 472-74.

148

See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying discussion.

149

See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying discussion.

150

See Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 300, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 234; Wieder v. Skala, 80 N.Y.2d 105,
107, 593 N.Y.S.2d 752, 754 (1992).

151

See e.g. Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 300, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 234 (dismissing employee’s tort
based claim for discharge where employer had discharged employee for reporting
accounting improprieties prior to the effective date of Sarbanes-Oxley).
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The difficulty for the employee thus comes in trying to prove that the real reason for the
adverse action was discrimination or retaliation, rather than “the red shirt” – as even the
“red shirt” is generally enough reason to fire an at-will employee.
Sarbanes-Oxley impacts upon state law in that it disallows adverse action against
an employee where the employee’s protected activity contributed to the decision to act
adversely.152 In this manner, Sarbanes-Oxley adds to the list another illegal reason for
firing the at-will employee in all state jurisdictions.153 Likewise, the employer would be
forced to state some other reason for its adverse action, although almost any reason could
be deemed legitimate by a reviewing tribunal.154 And of course, employees in all states
continue to benefit from state employment laws that do not contradict or contravene the
intent or language of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.155 Many of these state whistleblower laws
are, however, narrowly drawn or offer little protection for those blowing the whistle on
securities fraud.156
For example, in New York, the state whistleblower statute only protects
employees from retaliation when the employee reports a violation that specifically affects

152

See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying discussion.

153

Of course, the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution requires that the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act will trump state employment at will doctrine where an employee’s
actions are so protected. See U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl.2.

154

See e.g. Anderson, ARB Case No. 05-011 at 3, 7.

155

See, e.g. McKinney’s Labor Law s. 740 (protecting whistleblowing employees in New
York State that report violations that create a threat to public health or safety). See U.S.
Const. Art. VI, cl.2.
156

See, e.g. McKinney’s Labor Law s. 740.
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the public health.157 Employees are otherwise left largely unprotected under the state’s
common law158 while employers are heavily protected by the common law doctrine of at
will employment.159 In Murphy v. American Home Products, for example, the New York
State Court of Appeals reaffirmed its longstanding commitment not to imply obligations
into the employer/employee relationship absent some authority to do so from the
legislature.160 In Murphy, the Court refused to recognize the tort of “abusive discharge”
in the employee at will relationship161 and refused even to imply an obligation of good
faith into the relationship.162
Similarly, in Horn v. New York Times, an employee physician brought a claim in
New York state court against her employer for wrongful discharge after she refused to
share other employees’ confidential medical information with the employer.163 The
Court refused to find that the contract had implied terms where doing so would not

157

See, e.g. McKinney’s Labor Law s. 740.

158

See, e.g. Murphy,, 58 N.Y.2d at 301, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 235..

159

See, e.g. Remba v. Fed. Employment and Guidance Serv., 149 A.D.2d 131,134, 545
N.Y.S.2d 140, 142 (1st Dept. 1989), aff’d, 76 N.Y.2d 801, 559 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1991);
Weider v. Scala, 80 N.Y.2d 628, 633, 593 N.Y.S.2d 752, 754 (1992)(implying exception
to at-will employment contract where implied obligation would further employment
contract’s underlying terms); Horn v. New York Times, 100 N.Y.2d 85, 95, 760 N.Y.S.2d
378, 383 (2003)(declining to find exception to at-will employment agreement and
holding in favor of employer even where employee presented sympathetic facts).

160

Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 300-02, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 235-36.

161

Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 300-02, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 235-36.

162

Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 304-05, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 237-38.

163

Horn, 100 N.Y.2d at 95, 760 N.Y.2d at 383,.
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further the underlying agreement of the parties.164 The court held that the physician
employee was really engaged in a managerial role, charged with determining whether
employees’ injuries were work-related.165 Any medical care that she actually gave, the
court reasoned, was ancillary to the managerial role she played.166 The court thus held
that not disclosing patient confidences was not central to her role as an employee and
implying the obligation of confidentiality would not be in “furtherance” of the
employer/employee relationship.167 Absent legislative change, the court in Horn refused
to imply such an obligation into the contract.168 Thus Horn illustrates a situation where
New York’s highest court allowed an employer to legally dismiss the plaintiff, an at-will
employee, even though the employer’s conduct appeared to be unethical and the
employee appeared to be acting properly.169
In contrast, under New Jersey law, at-will employees receive greater protection
against adverse actions when they are acting specifically to serve the public good. In
Donofry v. Autotote Systems, Inc., the court noted that New Jersey’s whistleblower
statute protected an employee who blew the whistle about his employer’s use of
164

Horn, 100 N.Y.2d at 94, 760 N.Y.2d at 383.

165

Horn, 100 N.Y.2d at 95, 760 N.Y.2d at 383.

166

Horn, 100 N.Y.2d at 95, 760 N.Y.2d at 383.

167

Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 304-05, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 237 (citing Wood v. Duff-Gordon, 222
N.Y. 88, 118 N.E.214 (1917)).
168

See Horn, 100 N.Y.2d at 94, 760 N.Y.2d at 383.

169

See Horn, 100 N.Y.2d at 94, 760 N.Y.2d at 383; but see Fraser, 417 F.Supp.2d at
324-325 (allowing breach of contract claim alongside Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower
claim where employee manual stated that employees were responsible for reporting
illegal conduct).
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unlicensed workers.170 Other New Jersey courts, however, have noted that where an
employee acts merely in his own interests and only indirectly serves the public good, he
will not be protected by New Jersey’s whistleblower statue and will be subject to the
vagaries and lesser protections of New Jersey state common law.171
And similarly, under Texas law, for example, the at-will employee gets little
protection from state law. In that state, the at-will relationship can be terminated despite
the whistleblowing status of the person or persons subject to termination.172 In Bohatch
v. Butler and Binion, the court held that a law firm was not liable in tort to a
lawyer/whistleblower who reported overbilling of the firm’s clients.173
In summary, if the corporate whistleblower is not specifically protected by a state
whistleblower statute, he must rely on state common law, which will generally offer little
protection, or ultimately on Sarbanes-Oxley protection. The problem thus becomes one
of circular reasoning in that Sarbanes-Oxley actually allows an employer to escape
liability if the employer can show that he discharged the employee for a legitimate
reason.174 Since almost any reason is a legitimate reason under many states laws, the

170

Donofry v. Autotote, 795 A. 2d 260 (N.J Super. A.D. 2001)(applying the
Conscientious Employees’ Projection Act knows as “CEPA,” N.J.S.A. 34:19-3).

171

Demas v. Nat’l Westminster Bank, 712 A.2d 693, 696, 52 (Sup. Ct. 1998); see also
Green v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 828 A.2d 883 (N.J. 2003).

172

Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 41 Tex. S.Ct. J. 308, 977 S.W.2d 543, 547 (1998).

173

Bohatch, 41 S.Ct. J. 308, 977 S.W.2d at 546-47.

174

See Bechtel v. Competitive Tech., Inc., Case No. 2005-SOX-00033, at 39-40.
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employer can simply urge that the employee was fired for reasons other than his
reporting, and escape liability under Sarbanes-Oxley.175
In the final analysis, the only way the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower can survive
an employer’s proof of legitimate action is if he can get the court to engage in a “dual
motive” analysis.176 Having decided that both discriminatory and the non-discriminatory
motives played a part in the decision to terminate the whistleblower, the tribunal can
decide whether the employer would have dismissed the employee if not for the whistle
blowing activity. If the tribunal determines that absent the whistleblowing activity, the
employer would not have acted adversely toward the employee, even though the
employee also had a legitimate reason for action, then the court will rule in favor of the
employee.177 The problem is that courts and administrative tribunals have not routinely
engaged in the “dual motive”178 analysis. The result is that the employer simply offers
what would otherwise be a legitimate reason for its adverse action against the employee,
thereby vitiating any real Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protection.179 It thus appears
that the convergence of the at-will employment doctrine and the burden set out for a
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower, leave the whistleblower largely unprotected.

175

See Bechtel v. Competitive Tech., Inc., Case No. 2005-SOX-00033, at 39-40.

176

See Platone v. Atlantic Coast Airlines Holdings, Inc., Case No., 2003-SOX-00027, at
28 (ALJ Apr. 30, 2004).

177

See Platone Case No., 2003-SOX-00027, at 28.

178

See, e.g. Bechtel v. Competitive Tech. Inc., 448 F.3d at 472-75.

179

See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying discussion.
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Part IV: The Breadth and Effectiveness of Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower
Protections__________________________________________________
A. Sarbanes-Oxley Statistics to Date
The U.S. Department of Labor’s own statistics bear out this lack of protection for
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowers.180 As of June 2005, the Department of Labor had
compiled a comprehensive list of statistics on Sarbanes-Oxley cases. As of June 2005,
492 whistleblower cases had been filed under Sarbanes-Oxley and 99 of those cases181
were still pending before OSHA in the investigative stage of the proceedings.182 Of the
total number filed, 58 cases had been voluntarily withdrawn before OSHA issued any
findings.183 Some of these cases have likely been filed in federal court as is allowed
pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley if more than 180 days have passed before a final decision in
the matter.184 OSHA investigators had completed 393 cases.185 Of the 393 cases that had
been completed by OSHA, OSHA had dismissed 289 of those for lack of merit.186 Thus,
180

Telephone Interview with Nilgen Tolek, Director of Office of Investigative
Assistance, Occupation Safety and Health Administration (June 13, 2005) [hereinafter
Tolek Interview] (describing the status of cases filed under Sarbanes-Oxley); Telephone
Interview with Nilgen Tolek, Director of Office of Investigative Assistance, Occupation
Safety and Health Administration (June 16, 2005) [hereinafter Tolek Interview II]
(describing the status of cases filed under Sarbanes-Oxley).

181

Tolek Interview II, supra note 180 and accompanying discussion. (describing the
status of cases filed under Sarbanes-Oxley).

182

Tolek Interview, supra note 180 and accompanying discussion (describing the status
of cases filed under Sarbanes-Oxley).
183

Tolek Interview, supra note 180 and accompanying discussion.

184

69 Fed. Reg. at 52117 (part 1980.114).

185

Tolek Interview, supra note 180.

186

Tolek Interview, supra note 180.
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as of June 2005, OSHA had dismissed almost 82% of the cases that it had before it under
Sarbanes-Oxley prior to a hearing.187
Only 64 of the cases before OSHA were found to have merit.188 Of those found to
have merit, the parties settled prior to a hearing in 49 out of 64 of those cases.189 These
statistics indicate that it is very difficult for a complainant to succeed at the initial stage of
the Sarbanes-Oxley proceedings, the stage in which OSHA makes its initial
determination before a hearing.190
Once a complainant requests a hearing before an administrative law judge, he
fairs even worse.191 The Office of Administrative Law Judges reported that, as of April
2005,192 it had docketed 155 total cases under Sarbanes-Oxley, and decided 119 cases. 193

187

See id.

188

Tolek Interview, supra note 180. The total cases reported include all those filed with
OSHA under Sarbanes-Oxley and some of these cases have multiple complainants.
Tolek Interview, supra note 180. Determinations made by OSHA are counted separately
for each complainant and hence there exists a discrepancy between the number of cases
filed and those in which OSHA has made a determination. Tolek Interview, supra note
180.
189

Tolek Interview, supra note 180.

190

See Tolek Interview, supra note 180.

191

Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Complaints Docketed Before the U.S. Department of
Labor, Office of Administrative Law Judges, Statistical Overview as of April 28, 2005
(available from the Office of Administrative Law Judges and on file with author)
[hereinafter OALJ Statistical Overview];Www.oalj.dol.gov (Visited June 21, 2005).

192

According to a senior attorney with the Office of Administrative Law Judges, statistics
on the number and disposition of future cases and decisions since June 2005 will not be
compiled in the near future. Telephone Interview with Tod Smith, Senior Attorney at
Office of Administrative law Judges (January 24,2006) [hereinafter Smith Interview I].

193

Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Complaints Docketed Before the U.S. Department of
Labor, Office of Distractive Law Judges, Statistical Overview as of April 28, 2005
(available from the Office of Administrative Law Judges and on file with author)
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As of June 2005, only four out of the 119 total whistleblower complainants under
Sarbanes-Oxley had been successful at a hearing.194 Nineteen of the cases were settled
and 24 chose to pursue their claims in federal court,195 where the author only knows of a
handful of successful plaintiffs who have survived motions for summary judgment by the
corporate employer196 and one other widely publicized case that had been scheduled for
trial, but has been reportedly settled as of this writing.197
B. The Appearance of Bias
The statistics from the pending and past administrative proceedings in SarbanesOxley whistleblower cases point to a problem.198 A complainant has only a small
statistical chance of success prior to a hearing199 and if a complainant does request a
hearing after a determination of his claim by OSHA, it appears that he has an even

[hereinafter OALJ Statistical Overview];Www.oalj.dol.gov (Visited June 21, 2005). Of
the 289 cases dismissed by the Secretary before a hearing, the parties only requested that
the Office of Administrative Law judges take jurisdiction for purposes of a hearing in 155
of these complaints.
194

OALJ Statistical Overview, supra note 193.

195

OALJ Statistical Overview, supra note 193.

196

Collins, 334 F.Supp.2d at 1380-81; Fraser v. Fid. Trust Co. Intl., 417 F. Supp.2d 310,
322-23, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)(holding that complainant’s reporting did not have to rise to
level of that reported by Sherron Watkins to trigger protection of statute); Romaneck v.
Deutsche Asset Management, No. C05-2473 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (denying summary
judgment where complainant raised fact issue concerning causation element of SarbanesOxley claim).

197

Dallas Morning News, June 10, 2005, TXU Opts to Settle Whistleblower Suit, by
Sudeep Reddy; e.g. Murray v. TXU Corp., 279 F. Supp.2d 799 (N.D. Tex. 2003).

198

OALJ Statistical Overview, supra note 193.

199

OALJ Statistical Overview, supra note 193.
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smaller chance of success as only four of the 119 cases docketed for hearing have
resulted in a positive outcome for the complainant.200 There thus appears to be an
inherent bias against the complainant at the investigative and at the hearing stages of the
proceedings.201 Employees are having a difficult time refuting their employer’s defenses
in Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower proceedings .202
In addition to the fact that there appears to be an inherent bias against employees
in Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower cases; there are other substantive and procedural
problems with the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower provisions. These problems are
discussed in sections C. and D. below.
C. Procedural Problems Inherent in Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Proceedings
1.

Timing

Given that the Sarbanes-Oxley administrative procedure was designed to be an
expedited proceeding,203 the respondent employer theoretically has 20 days from receipt
of the complaint to meet with OSHA and present evidence in support to of its position.204
If the OSHA investigator believes that the respondent employer has violated the Act, and
that preliminary relief for the complainant is warranted, 205 OSHA notifies the employer,

200

See OALJ Statistical Overview, supra note 193.

201

See OALJ Statistical Overview, supra note 193.

202

See supra notes 180-202 and accompanying discussion.

203

See 69 Fed. Reg. at 52107.

204

69 Fed. Reg. at 52106.

205

69 Fed.Reg. at 52106.
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who is supposed to have ten business days to respond with legal and factual arguments in
support to of its position,206 arguing against a preliminary award of relief.207
Ideally, these proposed time frames might help level a playing field stacked
heavily in favor of the employer. While the employer will often have more resources
than the employee, the one advantage the employee has in a whistleblower proceeding, at
least initially, is that he is intimately familiar with the facts surrounding the adverse
action against him. Such familiarity with the facts would be extremely helpful in a fastpaced proceeding. Yet, the implementing regulations, laying out these strict time
guidelines are not being enforced by the U.S. Department of Labor.208 When the
Department of Labor grants the parties extra time, contrary to the implementing
procedures, these extensions most often benefit the employer and hurt the employee, who
is likely unemployed and in dire need of immediate relief.
2.

Access to Information and Witnesses and One-Sided Submissions

Moreover, the initial implementing procedures for the investigation also stack the
odds against the employee because they allow employers to make submissions to OSHA
to which the employee has no access and to which he does not have the opportunity to
respond.209 These submissions can be damaging and in some cases can contain
inaccuracies that will lead to a decision adverse to the employee. Perhaps more
206

69 Fed. Reg. at 52106.

207

69 Fed.Reg. at 52107. This section is expressly stated to provide due process
protection to the Respondent in accord with the United States Supreme Court’s decision
under another whistleblower statute, the STAA. Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481
U.S. 252 (1987).

208

See supra note 48 and accompanying discussion.

209

69 Fed. Reg. at 52106.
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importantly, the employer has open access to current employee “witnesses,” who have
every motivation to support the employer and make sworn statements on its behalf at
every stage in the investigative proceeding. Such statements put current employees in
good stead and allow current employees to avoid siding with a former whistleblowing
employee who is now suing their employer.
3. Is the Administrative Proceeding a Forced Waiting Period?
Finally, the administrative proceeding before OSHA might be considered a forced
waiting period for the Sarbanes-Oxley complainant. While it is true that the SarbanesOxley complainant can file a complaint in Federal Court if the Secretary of Labor has not
issued a final decision within 180 days of the filing, many complainants may endure the
wait and do just this. Since a multitude of Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower cases will not
be investigated and completed to final decision in 180 days,210 the complainant is literally
required to endure a one-sided prolonged administrative proceeding with no real hope of
quick satisfaction before he may seek redress in federal court. This aspect of SarbanesOxley wastes administrative resources and frustrates vigilant good faith litigants: litigants
who may now be now out of work and without incoming resources. Indeed, the length of
the OSHA administrative proceeding may actually force the complaining employee to
take positions he might otherwise have resisted.211

210

See supra note 48 and accompanying discussion.

211

See e.g. Tolek Interview, supra note 180.
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D. Applying Burden Shifting to Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Cases and Issues of
Proof: Substantive Problems In Whistleblower Cases______________________
While the general discrimination law is not specifically applicable to SarbanesOxley cases,212 a complaining party under Sarbanes-Oxley, just as in a garden-variety
discrimination case, must somehow prove that he was treated wrongly. A SarbanesOxley plaintiff must initially prove his case at a hearing by a preponderance of the
evidence.213 As in past types of discrimination cases, this then causes a burden shifting
analysis.214 Whereas the burden shifting analysis in discrimination cases was originally
determined by the U.S. Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas,215 under Sarbanes-Oxley,
the evidentiary framework is provided by statute and is slightly less onerous for the
employee.216 Initially, suffice it to say that the Sarbanes – Oxley plaintiff must prove that
he was treated adversely and that his protected activities contributed to the decision to

212

Stone and Webster Eng’g Corp., 115 F.3d at 1572.

213

18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b) (expressly incorporating burdens of proof contained in 49
U.S.C. 42121 (b)(2)(A) (“AIR 21”); supra notes 26-28, 60 and accompanying discussion.

214

See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b).

215

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed. 668
(1973).

216

18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b) (expressly incorporating standards in 49 U.S.C. 42121
(b)(2)(A) (“AIR 21”); Collins, 334 F.Supp.2d at 1374-75. The framework in SarbanesOxley whistleblower cases thus requires the complainant to bear the burden of proving
his case by a preponderance of the evidence. If he succeeds, the employer may rebut the
presumption of discrimination with clear and convincing evidence that its actions were
supported by legitimate non-discriminatory motives. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b) (expressly
incorporating standards in 49 U.S.C. 42121 (b)(2)(A) (“AIR 21”); see supra notes 26-28
and accompanying discussion. The difference between the two frameworks is more fully
discussed infra note 236.
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treat him wrongly and he must do this by a “preponderance of the evidence.”217 The
employer must then present “clear and convincing evidence” of a legitimate reason for its
adverse action.218 If the employer succeeds in this proof, the employee must ultimately
bear the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason proffered
by the employer is pretextual.219
1. Issues of Proof
Past discrimination cases are illustrative, if not for the exact application of the
complainant’s burden of proof, then for the kinds of evidence a complainant may use to
show he was treated differently, and ultimately, wrongfully.220 In past discrimination
cases, the courts have noted that a plaintiff may prove discrimination, lacking any direct
evidence, with circumstantial evidence221 such as proof of disparate treatment222 or with
proof of a pattern of past discrimination.223 As these kinds of evidence are often not
available to a whistleblowing employee since he may be the first to “blow the whistle,”

217

18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b) (expressly incorporating standards in AIR 21, 49 U.S.C. 42121
(b)(2)(A).

218

Id.

219

Id.

220

See e.g., Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 2154 (2003);
Riley v. Emory Univ., 2005 WL 1395045, at 2 (11th Cir. June 14, 2005).
221

See e.g., Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 100-101, 123 S.Ct. at 2154-55
(acknowledging the utility of circumstantial evidence in discrimination cases).
222

See e.g., Riley v. Emory Univ., 2005 WL 1395045, at 2 (June 14, 2005 11th Cir.).

223

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed. 668
(1973).
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the ability to beat back an employer’s “clear and convincing” evidence of legitimate
motives is more limited for the “whistleblowing” employee under Sarbanes-Oxley.224
Moreover, employers appear ready and able to offer up seemingly “legitimate”
reasons for their adverse employment actions.225 They are able to find some fault of an
employee (as one would expect since we are dealing with human subjects) and defeat
most whistleblower claims.226 In this way, employers appear able to easily defeat
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower claims.227
This is not surprising given that within the confines of many states’ common law,
almost any seemingly sensible reason for discharge of an at-will employee will suffice.228
Although the courts have noted that Congress intended an employer to have a difficult
time proving that a “legitimate” reason existed for an adverse action taken against a
whistleblowing employee protected by Sarbanes-Oxley and other federal whistleblower
law,229 this does not appear to be the case.230

224

See infra notes 263-64, 280, 282 and accompanying discussion.

225

See e.g., Bechtel v. Competitive Tech., Inc., 2005-SOX-00033, at 39-40 (citing
financial reasons as basis for complainant’s discharge).

226

See OALJ Statistical Overview, supra note 193.

227

OALJ Statistical Overview, supra note 193.

228

Indeed, employers are often known to successfully claim a bad attitude as a reason for
discharge. See, eg. Platone v. Atlantic Coast Airlines Holdings, Inc., Case No., 2003SOX-00027 at 25 (ALJ Apr. 30, 2004); Yule v. Burns Intl Sec. Serv., Case No. 93-ERA12, at 6 (Sec’y. May 24, 1995)(“insubordination” as basis for termination).

229

Stone and Webster Eng’g Corp., 115 F.3d at 1572.

230

See e.g., Bechtel v. Competitive Tech., Inc., Case No. 2005-SOX-00033, at 39-40; see
ALJ statistical Overview, supra note 193.
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2. Burden Shifting Under Sarbanes-Oxley
The burden-shifting framework under Sarbanes-Oxley also presents difficulties
for the whistleblower both because he is an employee at will, as are most other plaintiffs
in discrimination suits,231 and because he is in a unique position. This is so in that in the
vast majority of cases, there will have been no past whistleblowing and hence, no history
or pattern of discrimination to draw on in proving his case.232 Lacking these similarly
situated persons, and faced with a seemingly legitimate reason for adverse action by the
employer,233 the “whistleblowing” complainant has extreme difficulty ever rebutting the
employer’s clear and convincing evidence of its legitimate motive for adverse action.234
Moreover, while it is somewhat rare for an employer to be unaware of an
employee’s status in a Title VII discrimination case,235 – it would be very difficult for
example for an employer to claim it did not know an employee’s sex or race for example
– it much more common for an employer in a “whistleblowing” situation to claim that it
was unaware of the employee’s protected status when it acted adversely against him.236

231

See e.g., Platone v. Atlantic Coast Airlines, Case No. 2003-SOX-00027; Welch v.
Cardinal Bankshares Corp., Case No. 2003-SOX-15.

232

See 411 U.S. at 805, 93 S.Ct. at 1825-26 (noting that statistics as to petitioner
employer’s past hiring practices conformed to a “general pattern” of discrimination).
233

See supra notes 128-132 and accompanying discussion.

234

See OALJ Statistical Overview, supra note 193 (citing statistics on the resolution of
OSHA cases before and after hearings) and Tolek Interview supra note 180.

235

Woodman, 2005 WL 1384334, at 8 (noting that normally an employer would have
reason to know a complaining employee’s age, but here the decision to terminate was
made by officials at an acquiring company who had apparently never met or reviewed
complainant’s personnel file).
236

See Overall v. Tennessee Valley Auth., ARB Nos. 98-111, 98-128, at 9, ALJ No.
1997-ERA-53 (ARB Apr. 30, 2001) (employer managers alleged they were unaware of
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These evidentiary difficulties are borne out in the Sarbanes-Oxley cases decided
to date.237 While a very few complainants have been successful in proving their cases
initially at a hearing, they most often run into difficulty in that their employer puts forth
evidence of a “legitimate” non-discriminatory motive for the adverse action. 238
Employers may be able to easily offer what might be seen as “clear and convincing”
evidence of such reasons, even if in the form of affidavits or testimony of current
employees.239 In the face of these “witness” statements, from those current employees
obviously hoping to please and certainly hoping not to anger their current employers, the
whistleblowing employee has great difficulty proving that the stated “legitimate motive”
is a pretext for the real reason for the termination.240
In Parshley v. America West Airlines, for example, the complainant was
terminated after she reported missing serviceable tags for aircraft parts, a protected report
complainant’s activity when he was laid off ). Cases arising under the ERA closely
parallel the McDonnell Douglas framework in terms of burdens of proof. Overall v.
Tennessee Valley Auth., ARB Nos. 98-111, 98-128, at 9, ALJ No. 1997-ERA-53 (ARB
Apr. 30, 2001)(court noting that employer had articulated a legitimate reason for its
actions).
237

See supra notes 180-203 and accompanying discussion.

238

See, e.g., Taylor v. Wells Fargo, Texas, 2004-SOX-0043, at 13 (ALJ, Feb. 14, 2005)
(complainant proved retaliation was a factor in adverse action against him); Halloum v.
Intel Corp., 2003-SOX-7, at 16 (ALJ Mar. 4, 2004) (retaliatory action by employer
inferred from the facts of case); Bechtel v. Competitive Tech., Inc., 2005-SOX-00033, at
36.

239

See, e.g., Parshley v. America West Airlines, 2002-AIR-10, at 52-52 (ALJ August 5,
2002); Bechtel v. Competitive Tech., Inc., Case No. 2005-SOX-00033, at 39-40.

240

See, e.g., Taylor v. Wells Fargo, Texas, Case No. 2004-SOX-0043, at 13 (even if
retaliation was a factor in adverse action against employee, respondent put forth a
legitimate non-discriminatory motive for its adverse action); Halloum v. Intel Corp.,
2003-SOX-7, at 16 (although retaliatory action inferred ultimate decision for respondent
in that respondent proved legitimate motive).
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under AIR 21, and after receiving numerous commendations and raises for her good work
at the company.241 The employer countered, alleging that she had been selected for
termination based on performance issues and for cost-cutting purposes.242 The employer
made these assertions although no performance issues were noted in her personnel files
prior to her termination and the employer subsequently hired an outside employee to fill
Parshley’s place.243 The court nonetheless accepted the employer’s testimony as
credible244 and decided that Parshley could not meet her ultimate burden of proof, even
where the employer’s hiring of a new outside person belied the employer’s stated reason
for termination.245
While Parshley illustrates just how the burden-shifting framework of SarbanesOxley might present unique problems for the whistleblower under Sarbanes-Oxley246 a
small handful of cases that have been decided thus far under Sarbanes-Oxley have
actually parsed through employer’s explanations and come to equitable decisions.247 In
these cases, the court has looked closely at an employer’s motivations, specifically noting

241

Parshley v. America West Airlines, 2002-AIR-10, at 52.

242

See Parshley v. America West Airlines, 2002-AIR-10, at 52.

243

See Parshley v. America West Airlines, 2002-AIR-10, at 52.

244

Parshley v. America West Airlines, 2002-AIR-10, at 53.

245

Parshley v. America West Airlines, 2002-AIR-10, at 52-53.

246

Parshley v. America West Airlines, 2002-AIR-10, at 52-53.

247

Platone v. Atlantic Coast Airlines, Case No. 2003-SOX-00027, at 25-28 (ALJ April
30, 2004); Welch, 2003 – SOX – 15, at 47 (respondent employer could not present clear
and convincing evidence of legitimate reason for termination).
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that a “whistleblowing” employee may sometimes “touch a nerve”248 with his activities.
Although there may be no direct evidence that an employer took adverse action based on
the protected activity, the investigating and ultimate reporting may have caused the
employer to look upon the employee with disfavor.249
In Platone, the court held that even though the airline for which Platone worked
could have legitimately terminated her because she was romantically involved with
another employee (involvement that was prohibited by her employer),250 her reporting
nonetheless contributed to the decision to fire her.251 The court held that the company
had to bear the risk that the legal and illegal motives could not be separated.252 Thus
employing a “dual motive” analysis,253 the administrative law judge found that where
Platone demonstrated that her reporting activities contributed to the decision to take
adverse action against her, the decision would be in favor of the employee.254 The court
noted that it is not enough that under the circumstances in retrospect, the employer made

248

Platone v. Atlantic Coast Airlines, Case No. 2003-SOX-00027, at 25.

249

Platone v. Atlantic Coast Airlines, Case No. 2003-SOX-00027, at 26 (noting that
Platone’s supervisors were unhappy that she was “looking into” the “‘flight loss’ issue”).
250

Platone v. Atlantic Coast Airlines, Case No. 2003-SOX-00027, at 27.

251

Platone v. Atlantic Coast Airlines, Case No. 2003-SOX-00027, at 28; see also In the
Matter of Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health, and Kovas v.
Morin Transp., Case No. 92-STA-41, at 2-3 (DOL Off. Adm. App. Oct. 1, 1993)(for a
discussion of the dual motive analysis).

252

Platone v. Atlantic Coast Airlines, Case No. 2003-SOX-00027, at 28.

253

Platone v. Atlantic Coast Airlines, Case No. 2003-SOX-00027, at 25-28.

254

Platone v. Atlantic Coast Airlines, Case No. 2003-SOX-00027, at 27.

- 51 -

its decision on legitimate grounds.255 Rather, the employer’s motivation at the time it
made its decision is what must be considered.256 The Platone tribunal was unwilling to
accept employer’s testimony that there was a discontent with the complainant and general
performance issues without some additional contemporaneous proof, such as that which
might be found in a personnel file or other periodic reporting file.257
E. Practical Difficulties for Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers
In addition to facing the procedural and substantive difficulties inherent in the
Sarbanes-Oxley administrative proceeding, the whistleblowing complainant also faces
unique practical challenges that make it difficult for him to meet his burden of proof.
1. Disgraced and Out of Work
In a typical whistleblowing situation, the whistleblower has reported what he
knows to his superior, who may or may not be involved in the alleged corporate fraud, or
reported the same to the board of directors, and is now potentially disgraced and out of
work. It is at this juncture – psychologically weakened and potentially publicly disgraced
– that he must become ready and poised to fight a corporate giant.258
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Platone v. Atlantic Coast Airlines, Case No. 2003-SOX-00027, at 28.
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Platone v. Atlantic Coast Airlines, Case No. 2003-SOX-00027, at 28.
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See Platone v. Atlantic Coast Airlines, Case No. 2003-SOX-00027, at 28.

258

Sarbanes-Oxley by definition only applies to “whistleblowing” in “publicly traded”
companies, entities that are by nature large corporate entities. P.L. 107-204, Section 806,
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a).
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2. Inequity in Resources
As discussed above, Sarbanes-Oxley complainants have enjoyed little success.259
This is not a surprise when one considers the vast inequity in resources between the
employees and the public companies involved in a Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower
proceeding.260 Given vast resources, it appears that these large employers can easily beat
back accusations of improper termination based on whistleblowing so that the employee
may not ever have the opportunity to produce enough evidence to make it beyond the
investigative stage of the proceedings.261 Alternatively, the employer’s resources allows
it to mount an aggressive defense at the hearing stage, where it can readily offer what
might be deemed “clear and convincing evidence” of its legitimate reason for adverse
action.262
3. Witnesses are not Available or Willing to Testify
Another difficult and potentially insurmountable obstacle for the Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblower is that he is uniquely situated as an outsider with information to report vis
a vis his former co-workers and the corporation. Indeed, the situation that leads him to
have “whistleblowing” information in the first place, may have put him at odds with his
superiors and the board of directors of the corporation. The damaging information did
not likely just come to rest on his desk. A whistleblower may have sought the

259

See supra notes 180-202 and accompanying discussion.

260

See supra note 258 and accompanying discussion.

261

See supra notes 32-39, 186-187 and accompanying discussion.

262

But cf. Stone and Webster Eng’g Corp., 115 F.3d at 1572.
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information out over time; he may have been perceived as an uncooperative person;263 or
“not a team player” as he indirectly or directly disagreed with corporate action or inaction
in some manner. His role may be defined by his unwillingness to go along and he is thus
described as “uncooperative.” Moreover, this may be a game of egg and chicken: which
came first, the “uncooperative” attitude or the unwillingness to engage in unethical and
potentially illegal fraudulent behavior.264
Finally, an angry employee, because he does not like a general “unethical
atmosphere” may actually find reason to “sniff around,” further alienating himself from
his co-workers and superiors. As he engages in this hunting around for information, he
alienates himself further265 from those in positions of power and he becomes even more
intent on finding something wrong at the corporation. Indeed, he may relish the idea of
“ratting the company out.” The position of the corporate whistleblower is thus different
than the classic discrimination case in that his case of retaliatory discrimination may
develop over time and he may actually be directly pitted against those persons in power
who are engaged in wrongdoing. On the contrary, it is reasonable to assume that in many
classic discrimination claimants, such as those that lay claim under Title VII,266 claimants
are not initially antagonistic toward those in supervisory roles.

263

See Platone v. Atlantic Coast Airlines, Case No. 2003-SOX-00027, at 25.

264

Getman, Case No. 2003-SOX-00008, at 15, rev’d on other grounds, ARB 04-059
(ARB July 29, 2005) (analyst refused to change a stock rating); see infra note 265 and
accompanying discussion.
265

See e.g. Platone v. Atlantic Coast Airlines, Case No. 2003-SOX-00027, at 25 (noting
that Platone “touched a nerve” with her investigation).

266

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
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4. Mandatory Arbitration Agreements
Further complicating matters for the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower is the fact that
he may have signed a mandatory arbitration agreement with his employer. At least one
court has held that a Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower claim is subject to mandatory
arbitration even though the Sarbanes-Oxley proceeding is a statutory discrimination
proceeding.267 One commentator has posited that applying these mandatory arbitration
agreements to Sarbanes-Oxley plaintiffs weakens employee positions because arbitration
generally favors employers.268
The above procedural, substantive and practical difficulties make it difficult for a
corporate whistleblower to succeed. If employees are to willingly witness and report
fraud, changes are needed in the implementing procedures of Sarbanes-Oxley, the
effectuation of those procedures, and in the manner in which the employer’s burden of
proof is met.

267

Boss v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 263 F.Supp. 684, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The
United States Supreme Court has also held that mandatory arbitration agreements may
apply to compel arbitration in employee discrimination cases. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119, 123, 121 S.Ct. 1302, 1311 (2001). The Supreme Court
limited its decision somewhat in Equal Employment Opportunity Comm. v. Waffle House,
Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002) (holding that employment discrimination claim could proceed
in EEOC even where the employee was party to a mandatory arbitration agreement).
Overall, it appears that the United States Supreme Court favors enforcement of
mandatory arbitration agreements even in the context of an employee’s discrimination
claims.

268

Cherry, supra note 1,at 1082-83.
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Part V: Suggestions for the Future of the Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower
Provisions
_
_
_
_
_
________
A. Adherence to the Regulatory Timelines
Presently, the Department of Labor does not closely adhere to the timelines
provided under Sarbanes-Oxley.269 Given that the Sarbanes-Oxley administrative
procedure was designed to be an expedited proceeding,270 OSHA should strictly adhere to
the administrative timelines contained in the implementing regulations.271 The
Respondent would thus have a limited 20 days from receipt of the complaint to meet with
OSHA and present evidence in support to of its position.272 If the OSHA investigator
then believed that the respondent employer had violated the Act, and that preliminary
relief for the complainant were warranted, 273 the employer would only have another very
limited period of ten business days to respond, arguing against the preliminary award of
relief.274
If OSHA would adhere to these timelines, it would initially level the playing field
in that the employee, while most often having fewer resources than the corporation, has
better knowledge of the facts surrounding the adverse action against him.275 Moreover,
the indignant employee is most likely strongest initially, while the corporate giant has
269

See supra note 48 and accompanying discussion.

270

See 69 Fed. Reg. at 52107.

271

69 Fed. Reg. at 52106, 52107.

272

69 Fed. Reg. at 52106.

273

69 Fed.Reg. at 52106.

274

69 Fed.Reg. at 52107.

275

See supra notes 269-72, infra note 276 and accompanying discussion.
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been taken by surprise. In contrast, the corporate respondent will begin to investigate
once sued and mount a defense with its vast resources. As it does so, the corporate
employer will grow stronger and the employee, who is now most likely out of work, and
growing financially and emotionally less strong, will lose morale and the will to fight.
As the proceedings progress, within 60 days of the filing of the complaint, the
investigator is supposed to make a determination on behalf of the Assistant Secretary that
preliminary relief is warranted or that the complaint lacks merit.276 Again, adhering to
this schedule would also benefit the employee, who knows the facts surrounding his
adverse employment action best, and would not allow the corporate employee to fully
gain the advantage of its vast resources. Adhering to this strict time schedule would also
allow the employee to continue to have income if he were granted relief from the
administrator, including immediate reinstatement as per the regulations.277 If, on the
other hand, the expeditious proceeding did not result in a favorable outcome for the
employee, he could still demand a hearing before the Office of Administrative Law
Judges. Finally, expeditiously wrapping up the initial investigative stage of proceedings
would allow a hearing to proceed quickly, also to the general benefit of the employee –

276

Preliminary decisions by the Assistant Secretary that are supposed to be made by the
60-day deadline are not made readily available. 69 Fed.Reg. at 52108. The Department
of Labor has not, however, consistently made a determination within the 180-day
deadline. See http://www.oalj.dol.gov (cataloguing and digesting cases by date); see
supra note 48 and accompanying discussion.
277

69 Fed.Reg. at 52108. The viability of a preliminary order of reinstatement has been
called into question by the Bechtel decision. 448 F.3d at 472-75; supra notes 144-45, 147
and accompanying discussion.
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and again leveling what appears to be a very unequal playing field.278 The employee
would also benefit from the more expeditious proceeding as the employee likely has few
witnesses to prepare, since former co-employees (current employees of the corporation)
are not likely to testify on his behalf, while the employer has many potential witnesses
and must develop a more complicated case for hearing.
B. Make the Employer’s Burden Even More Onerous
While the employer can beat back the whistleblower’s claim if it can show clear
and convincing evidence of a legitimate reason for its action against the employee, this is
often easy for it to do: given the employer’s access to a cadre of potential “witnesses”
within its current employee ranks. To redress this inequity, employers could be required
to present at least some documentary evidence to support its adverse action and to defend
an employee’s case of retaliatory action. I am not suggesting here a statutory change, as
it is clear that Congress has not required “direct” evidence in Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblower cases, nor has it done so in other discrimination cases.279 I am rather
suggesting a normative shift in perception as to what constitutes “clear and convincing
evidence” in the case of whistleblowing employees under Sarbanes-Oxley.
This shift in perception, requiring more stringent proof from employers to meet
the “clear and convincing evidence” standard, is necessary in that the Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblower is uniquely situated. The Sarbanes-Oxley complainant may have blown
the whistle about securities fraud and other crimes. Indeed, he may find that he cannot

278

See 18 U.S.C. s. 1514A((b)(2) (adopting 49 U.S.C. s. 42121 (b)((2); 69 Fed.Reg. at
52108.

279

Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 98-99, 123 S.Ct. at 2153-54.
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bear the ultimate burden of persuasion because his immediate past superior, who might
be able to attest to his past good work, is under investigation or indictment, and is either
unwilling or unable to support the former employee. Moreover, it may be that many of
the whistleblowing employee’s former colleagues participated in the fraud, are witnesses
to the fraud, or are facing criminal or other legal charges in connection with the alleged
fraud.
Indeed, the Sarbanes-Oxley complainant may be cut off from all contact with his
former colleagues, these former colleagues refusing to get involved on the advice of
counsel or for fear of “engaging” with a whistleblower. It will often be difficult for a
whistleblower complainant to convince any of his former co-workers to talk to him or to
testify on his behalf for fear of termination280 or criminal reprisals. In at least one case, a
whistleblowing employee resorted to the use of an affidavit from the CEO of a company
with which she had had business dealings to refute the testimony of her direct
supervisor.281 In many instances it, however, will not be possible for a whistleblower to
get an employee of another company to vouch for him since even the “outsider” will fear
damaging his own relationships with the respondent employer in the process.
Additionally, many lower level personnel never have contact with anyone outside the
company who would be in a position to vouch for their good work; and yet, these lower
level employees may be the first to witness corporate fraud in a workplace.

280

Getman, Case No. 2003-SOX-00008, at 17, rev’d on other grounds, ARB 04-059
(ARB July 29, 2005)(noting that complainant beat back claims that she was not a
competent employee with an affidavit of an officer from another company).
281

Getman, Case No. 2003-SOX-00008, at 17, rev’d on other grounds, ARB 04-059
(ARB July 29, 2005).
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The potential criminal ramifications involved in a Sarbanes-Oxley complaint, the
often sweeping investigations that accompany whistleblower complaints under SarbanesOxley, and corporate employees’ general unwillingness to take the side of a former
employee whistleblower all make it difficult – if not impossible – for Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblowers to obtain the help of former colleagues.282 Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblowers, thus by the nature of what they report on, find themselves in a unique
and particularly isolating position vis a vis employees of the corporation.
C. Allow the Employee Access to Employer Submissions During the OSHA
Investigation________________________________________________
An anomaly of the Sarbanes-Oxley procedures allows OSHA to keep employer
submissions from employees during the investigative stage of the OSHA proceedings.283
Given the employees’ stature: out of work, potentially disheartened, and without
resources; this is a critical stage of the proceeding.284 At this stage, OSHA has the power
to order reinstatement of the employee, a remedy that was intended to be a very powerful
remedy.285 In many cases, the employer may not want the employee to return to work
and an order of reinstatement would be an enormous boon to an employee wishing to
settle a dispute with his employer. And yet, during this investigative stage, employers are
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See OALJ Statistical Overview, supra note 193.

283

See 69 Fed. Reg. at 52106-07; supra notes 34-39 and accompanying discussion.

284

See 69 Fed. Reg. at 52106-07.

285

But see Bechtel v. Competitive Tech. Inc., 448 F.3d at 472-75 (questioning the
viability of the reinstatement order); supra notes 144-45, and 147 and accompanying
discussion. See note 68 for a discussion of the Welch case and the reinstatement order
therein.
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permitted to submit statements to OSHA that are not given to the complainant.286 This
unfair aspect of the process does not further efforts to find the facts of a dispute and
should be modified to allow access to submissions for both parties.287
D. Corporate Culture
Corporations need to make it clear to their employees that they have a new role in
corporate America as “foot soldiers” in the battle against corporate fraud and
corporations must educate employees about corporate compliance issues.288 Public
corporations need to do more to make their employees aware of anonymous reporting
hotlines.289 They must encourage employees, even those at non-managerial levels, to
raise serious questions with their supervisors or if the situation requires it, with the
independent board of directors. Reporting potential violations in house – even to
executive management – may not be sufficient, where executive management may be
involved in the fraud.290 Of course, the difficulty is that there may be occasions where a

286

See 69 Fed. Reg. at 52106-07; supra notes 34-39 and accompanying discussion.

287

See 69 Fed. Reg. at 52106-07; supra notes 34-39 and accompanying discussion.
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has said that an airing of factual concerns,
however brief, serves due process in the proper context and may avoid erroneous
determinations. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266-67, 90 S.Ct. at 1020.
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Mechanisms for reporting potential violations should be well publicized. Teresa T.
Kennedy, Seth M. Cohen, Charles A. Riepenhofff, “About That Compliance
Thing…Creating and Evaluating Effective Compliance Programs,” ACC Docket 25
(Nov./Dec. 2004).
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Kennedy, et. al supra note 288, at 28.
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L. Dennis Kozlowski, former chairman and chief executive of Tyco International was,
for example, indicted and convicted of larceny and conspiracy. See, e.g., Openers: Suits;
Last Straw, by Andy Wickstrom, New York Times, August 27, 2006, Section 3, Page 2,
Column 2. To whom would a lower level employee at Tyco have safely reported if he
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non-managerial employee may not even know he has come upon corporate irregularity or
fraud; let alone whether to report these findings to his boss (who may be involved) or to a
higher authority, who also may be involved.291 The ultimate best way to solve this
problem is to encourage open communication throughout the organization and to have a
reporting line directly to the outside board of directors.
Conclusion
When Congress passed Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress intended that whistleblowers
would be protected once they had blown the whistle. Past cases demonstrate that
whistleblowers have been largely unsuccessful when they challenge their employer’s
adverse actions against them. The implementing regulations under the Act need to be
followed more closely and courts need to carefully scrutinize an employer’s asserted
legitimate reasons for acting against a whistleblowing employee. Until these modest, but
effective changes in the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower provisions
are made, and corporate culture more widely embraces open communication,
whistleblowers will not “pucker up and blow” in America. This is a great loss, as after
all, it is those who work in the corporations every day that first bear witness to the
transgressions that so often culminate in massive corporate fraud.

had had evidence of the crimes committed at Tyco before the government had such
information?
291

See Damon Darlin and Miquel Helft, H.P. Before a Skeptical Congress, N.Y. Times,
September 29, 2006 (top executives questioned in possible criminal fraud at HewlettPackard)
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